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IT users often make security-related decisions in complex and multidimensional
environments. Over-reliance on current behavioral security theories (e.g. Protection
Motivation Theory) that do not account for such circumstances can seriously limit
researchers’ ability to comprehend such decision making. In this regard, herd behavior
theory explains that when individuals make decisions in uncertain circumstances, they
may observe what other people are doing, discount their own limited information and
imitate others (also known as social learning). Explaining protection motivation behavior
from a different theoretical perspective (i.e. herd behavior) is one of the primary
contributions of this study. Investigating whether protection motivation behaviors
influenced by herd mentality can impact continuous secure behavior, as a very important
and understudied information security phenomenon, is the other contribution of this
study. In other words, examining whether security behaviors can be influenced by herdrelated factors in uncertain circumstances, as well as whether such behaviors persist over
time, is central to this study.

The findings of this research show that in uncertain circumstances and when there
is awareness about the widespread use of a certain security technology, users develop a
significantly higher protection motivation. Furthermore, the results show that at the postadoption stage, users tend to heavily rely on their own information and disregard the
herd-related factors.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Research Motivation
Information System (IS) security incidents and issues, such as insider threats,
abundance of malware, and system penetrations are increasing every year. According to
Symantec Internet Security Report (2016), in 2015, over half a billion personal records
were stolen or lost, phishing campaigns targeting employees increased 55 percent and
ransomware attacks increased 35 percent. In this regard, a key topic in IS security
research is finding mechanisms to motivate users to effectively protect their information
assets. Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) is one of the dominant theoretical
perspectives for investigating this phenomenon. PMT is focused on the idea of using
persuasive messages that warn of a personal threat and describe safeguarding measures
that encourage protective behavior (Floyd et al. 2000).
The core concept of PMT is that a fear appeal triggers two sequential cognitive
processes that must take place for an individual to engage in an adaptive response: First,
in the threat-appraisal stage, the threat that inspires protection motivation must outweigh
the maladaptive rewards earned by not engaging in protection motivation. Second, in the
coping-appraisal stage, an individual’s self-efficacy and response efficacy must outweigh
the response costs to engage in the protection motivation (Boss et al. 2015). Ideally, a
fear appeal not only increases the fear of a threat, but also increases efficacy by providing
1

a path to address the threat. Importantly, the best fear appeals create both high threat and
high efficacy because they address both the threat and the individual’s ability to deal with
it (Witte & Allen 2000; Boss et al. 2015). But what if a fear appeal message does not
include sufficient information about the safeguarding measure? What if a user’s fear of a
security threat is significantly high but there is also a very high level of uncertainty about
the protective response? How can we investigate individual security decisions in this
context? In such circumstances, relying solely on the core premises of PMT might not be
sufficiently insightful. This decision context demands a more nuanced theoretical lens.
Information imperfection, which can lead to uncertainty, is one of the major
phenomena that can bound an individual’s rationality (Simon, 1979). Bounded
rationality refers to the situation in which the rationality of individuals in decision
making is usually limited by their information, cognitive restrictions, and available time
for decision making. In other words, the concept of bounded rationality defines the
circumstances in which people's rationality is limited by incomplete information,
cognitive constraints, and time pressure. The existence of uncertainty prevents the
quantification of probabilities of future events (Simon, 1979; Baddeley, 2011). In
uncertain circumstances, herd behavior, also known as social learning, plays a
fundamental role in predicting humans’ behavior. According to the herd theory, without a
clear course to follow, it could be rational to follow other people and learn from the
signals about what they are doing (Acemoglu,1992).
In the behavioral security context, users may have to make security-related
decisions in a complex and multidimensional environment. Thus, relying on behavioral
security theories (e.g. Protection Motivation Theory) that account for neither insightful
2

phenomena such as decision making in uncertain circumstances nor concepts such as
herd behavior and social learning, could be very limiting. In fact, it is reasonable to argue
that predictions from theories like Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) can be more
precise if the circumstances under which people are likely to process potentially
threatening information and the recommended responses are carefully identified and
controlled. Thus, herd theory can provide insightful explanations for this phenomenon.
The other important, but understudied, topic in this context is the persistence of
secure behaviors over time. Users’ beliefs, attitudes, and appraisals are not static, and,
accordingly, secure behaviors are subject to change as evidenced when drivers usually
drive slower after witnessing an accident on the road, but then may eventually return to
their equilibrium behavior. In the IT context, as users experience (directly or vicariously)
a security threat (e.g. data loss, computer virus infection, etc.), they tend to engage in
improved security hygiene (Mutchler & Warkentin, 2015), but often only for a limited
time. In the organizational setting, employees may increasingly fail to back up their data
or scan for viruses as the effect of security education wears off over time. Understanding
the temporal dynamics of security behaviors that are influenced by herd-related factors is
crucial.
Research Questions
The goal of this research is to answer the following overarching research questions:
•

RQ1: In uncertain circumstances, to what extent are users more likely to cope
with security threats by engaging in herd behavior?
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•

RQ2: To what extend can herd mentality influence users’ post-adoption
behavior?

Furthermore, I draw on three primary theories of this study, Protection Motivation Theory,
Herd Theory, and Cognition Change Model (which is the extended version of
Disconfirmation Theory), which are explained in detail in Chapter II, to answer these
questions.
Research Method
The classical experimental design is used to test the previously mentioned
hypotheses. In this design, each participant is randomly assigned to one of two groups –
the control group or the treatment group. Through the course of the experiment,
participants answer items related to herd behavior, protection motivation perceptions, and
their continuance intention.
Establishing measurement validity of the research design is a necessary
requirement for any research study. Randomization decreases the influence of any
internal validity issues because any confounding variables are distributed across both
groups. The participants were recruited and then participated in the experiment by
completing an online Qualtrics survey and using a password manager for a week. In this
recruitment survey, participants first read an electronic consent form and information
related to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval of research ethics in this study.
Then, they provided their demographic information including age, sex, and education
level.
After the pilot test, the primary experiment was conducted to empirically test the
hypotheses presented in Chapter III. In addition, for this study, any Internet user with
4

little or no experience with using password managers qualified to participate in the
experiment. Those subjects (in both groups) who use a password manager, called
Dashlane, were qualified to participate in the second phase of the experiment. Ultimately,
the data collected from subjects who did not participate in the second phase were
discarded. I purchased panel data from Qualtrics, a professional research company.
Buying panel data is one of three main methods of data collection for behavioral
researchers, besides online crowdsourcing markets and college students (Steelman et al.,
2014). For example, Bulgurcu et al. (2010), Barlow et al. (2013) and Willison et al.
(2016) used panel data to investigate information security policy compliance.
Finally, to test the relationships among constructs, I analyzed the data using
covariance-based multi-group Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) in AMOS v24. SEM
is a second-generation statistical modeling technique that is better than comparable
multiple regression techniques because it enables researchers to answer a set of
interrelated research questions in a single, systematic, and comprehensive analysis (Gefen
et al. 2000). The details about the research method are discussed in Chapter III.
Contributions of the Study
Examining protection motivation behavior from a different theoretical perspective
(herd behavior) is one of the primary contributions of this study. Investigating the factors
that could sustain or weaken continuous secure behavior, a very important and
understudied information security concept, is the other primary contribution of this study.
In other words, examining whether security behaviors can be influenced by herd-related
factors in uncertain circumstances, as well as how such behaviors can persist over time, is
crucial to this study.
5

Organization of the Study
This research is organized into five chapters with appendices. Chapter I
introduces this study by defining the research motivation and objectives and presents the
research questions and hypotheses.
Chapter II reviews the current literature on protection motivation and herd
behavior, presents the conceptual research model, and supports the logic for research
hypotheses.
Chapter III outlines the details of the methods used to empirically test the
conceptual model and hypotheses. First, the experiment flow of this study is explained.
Then the treatment of the experiment is described. Next, the constructs of interest are
defined and their corresponding measurement items are presented. The details of the pilot
study and main investigation are subsequently discussed. Finally, the specifics about
model fit test, confirmation factor analysis, common method bias (CMB) and test of the
hypotheses (structural model) are explained.
In Chapter IV, I present the data analysis process and results. First, I describe the
results of the reliability analysis, principal component analysis and manipulation check.
Then, I describe the main study including participants’ demographics, confirmatory
factor analysis including item descriptives, measurement invariance, construct reliability
and validity. Then, I detail the results of the structural analysis including model fit, path
estimates and test of control variables in the model.
In Chapter V, I summarize the major findings of the study and interpret the
results. After explaining the key findings, I elaborate the contributions of this study to IS
security literature. Next, I explain the practical contributions and how practitioners (e.g.
6

IS security managers) can benefit from the findings of this study. Finally, I discuss the
limitations of the study and suggest suggestions for future research to overcome these
limitations and consequently, to deepen the current understanding of the phenomena
under study.

7

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Bounded Rationality in Behavioral Security
Bounded rationality occurs when individual decision makers’ rationality is limited
by incomplete information, cognitive constraints, and/or time pressure. If individuals are
boundedly rational, then the logical application of clear mathematical rules will not be
possible because the existence of incalculable uncertainty prevents the quantification of
probabilities of future events (Baddeley, 2011). Bounds to rationality can be
comprehended through Simon's (1979) distinction between substantive and procedural
rationality. He describes substantive rationality as the situation in which people
concentrate on achieving objective goals given constraints. If a person is substantively
rational, he will form quantifiable expectations of future and make his decisions via
constrained optimization techniques to balance marginal benefits with costs and
maximize utility. This indicates that if different individuals have access to the same
information, on average, they will have quite similar expectations about some objective
probability of outcomes.
Conversely, procedural rationality is centered on a wide reasoning process rather
than the achievement given representative agent's goals. This rationality is more likely to
be linked with satisficing (for instance, sticking with the current situation because it is
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convenient, even if it is not optimal) and involves broader approaches to information
processing (Simon, 1979).
Conventional economic theories hold the assumption that individuals act as
independent agents but modern economic theories admit that learning processes are
highly important if individuals are only inclined to efficiently look for information.
Economics theoreticians have also proposed belief learning models that are focused on
the processes through which individuals learn about the beliefs of their opponents
(Baddeley, 2011).
Social learning is another salient form of learning that has received growing
attention. Without a clear path to follow (characterized by high uncertainty), it could be
procedurally rational to follow the crowd and learn from signals about what other people
are doing (Acemoglu,1992). Similarly, Keynes (1937) argues that when a person’s
information is sparse, he will do what others are doing because maybe they know what
they are doing. In his analysis, rational agents may have incentives to follow the herd and
this behavior will lead to a response to people's perceptions of their own lack of
knowledge. Therefore, herd behavior will be rational if a person has reasons to believe
that other people’s judgements are based on better, more complete information than his
own. Consequently, this person will incorporate others' actions into his own prior
information set.
This imitation is a distinguishing characteristic of herd behavior. Blackmore
(1999) in her book named “The Meme Machine” states that: “Human brains’ size started
expanding at about the same time that we started using tools and once individuals began
to imitate each other, selection pressure favored those who could make good choices on
9

what to imitate, and could imitate intelligently.” The discovery of mirror neurons (the
pre-motor areas of primates that are activated without conscious control and generate
imitative behavior) provided some scientific support to biological explanations for
imitative behavior (Stamenov & Gallese, 2002).
Memes last long if remembered and will reproduce when effectively transmitted
among individuals. Thus, memes are more likely to survive if successfully mapped into
human cognitive processes, include a standard decision structure and are reinforced by
members (Baddeley, 2011).
The primary implication of these arguments for behavioral security is that if herd
leaders can be identified and incentivized to adopt appropriate IT protections, then others
will be highly likely to follow their lead. If information about the adopting the right IT
safeguards by others is eminent in information provided, then this influence will
encourage individuals to do what others are doing and this cooperation could lead to the
evolution of new social norms in behavioral security.
In the behavioral security context, decisions are made in a complex and
multidimensional environment and could include contradictory goals (choosing an easyto-use but not very effective safeguard versus a complex, yet highly effective safeguard).
Therefore, relying solely on behavioral security theories (e.g. Protection Motivation
Theory) that do not account for such insightful phenomena such as social learning,
decision making in highly uncertain circumstances, herd behavior, and any other factor
that bounds users’ rationality, could be very limiting.

10

Fundamentals of Protection Motivation Theory
The effect of fear appeals and how they impact IT users’ behavior have been a popular
research area in the information security field. Using persuasive messages, (e.g. fear
appeals), the effects of these messages on the behaviors of people were initially
investigated by psychology researchers during the 1950s (Janis & Feshbach, 1954). The
numerous studies resulted in findings that called for further research, but the
interpretation of these findings indicated the lack of an overarching theory until Rogers’
(1975) Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). Subsequently, researchers in other fields
such as marketing (Dillard & Anderson, 2004), communications (Witte, 1992), health
care (Kline & Mattson, 2000), and information security (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010;
Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) further investigated the capability of
fear appeals to prompt the appropriate intensity of fear about a threat and consequently,
change the individual attitudes and behaviors toward protecting themselves from threats.
The figure below depicts the overall structure of PMT:

Figure 2.1

The Overall Structure of Protection Motivation Theory

Rogers (1975)
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PMT states that when individuals are exposed to a fear appeal, two cognitive
mediating processes will arise and protection motivation behavior will be shaped. The
cognitive mediating processes include individuals’ threat appraisal as well as their
appraisal of the capacity to cope with that threat. Threat appraisal encompasses perceived
threat severity and perceived threat susceptibility. Coping appraisal incorporates
perceived response efficacy and perceived self-efficacy. An effective fear appeal must
include necessary details vis-a-vis the threat and the recommended response to a threat,
especially that the threat is likely to occur and is severe (Rogers,1983). In other words,
when individuals are exposed to a fear appeal message, they evaluate both the threat and
the available response, and their perception of the threat severity and susceptibility levels,
and consequently, response efficacy, and self-efficacy will determine the level of
protection motivation behavior. If the threat is serious and likely to happen, the
recommended response is perceived to be effective against the threat, and the fear appeal
message receiver believes she or he can successfully utilize the response, motivation
toward protective behavior will be increased. The following figure illustrates the
cognitive mediating process of PMT:

12

Figure 2.2

The Cognitive Mediating Process of Protection Motivation Theory

Rogers (1975)
Protection Motivation Theory in IS Context
PMT has been applied to several areas of information security field. Findings of
most studies indicate that PMT has substantial explanatory power for information
security phenomena; however, the findings have not been consistent across all studies.
There are numerous IS security threats with online activities such as blogging, using
social networking sites, and managing passwords of important online accounts (e.g.
Marett et al., 2011). In the case of social networks, IT users’ decision to whether share
personal information are mostly influenced by the threat appraisal variables (Marett et al.,
2011) as well as by social influence (Banks et al., 2010). Alternately, when it comes to
overall online security, self-efficacy and response efficacy have greater influence
(LaRose et al., 2008). Similarly, self-efficacy and response efficacy are found to be
strongly influential in online account password management behavior along with a
considerable negative relationship between response cost and intention to create strong
passwords (Zhang & McDowell, 2009).
13

PMT-based IS studies also include the investigation of general secure computing
practices (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Woon et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008) and
use of antivirus software (e.g. Garung et al., 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lee &
Larsen, 2009; Liang & Xue, 2010). Applying PMT to these contexts has also led to
varied results. For instance, perceptions of threat severity and susceptibility influence the
perceptions of self-efficacy, response efficacy, which in turn, and along with social
influence using anti-malware software in the Johnston & Warkentin (2010) study. The
following figure depicts the fear appeal model in IS security context:

Figure 2.3

The Fear Appeal Model in IS Security Context

Johnston & Warkentin (2010)
The results of another similar study showed that threat severity, self-efficacy, and
response efficacy are strong antecedents of antivirus software use, and that threat
vulnerability and response costs have no substantial influence (Garung et al., 2009). In
14

this regard, other such as the relationships between threat severity and self-efficacy and
threat severity and response efficacy have been found (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010); two
relationships that generally were not tested in PMT-based information security research.
As mentioned earlier, PMT research in information security area has produced
varied findings, compared to the prior PMT studies in other areas such as marketing and
health care. The factors that have not been usually included in prior PMT research have
been found to influence the antecedents of secure behavior in information security
context, indicating that PMT requires more development to better fit this context. For
instance, social influence is found to have a substantial influence on security behaviors
(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Pahnila et al., 2007). In addition, descriptive norms have
been found to determine protective behaviors against collective threats, with subjective
norms to be influential against individual threats (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010).
Furthermore, Boss et al. (2015) argue that the extant PMT literature do not use the full
nomology of PMT constructs and it is not appropriate. They also state that only one study
uses fear-appeal manipulations, even though fear appeal manipulation is a core element
of PMT, researchers have barely studied them (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010 and
Johnston et al. 2015 are the only exceptions). Third, almost no information security study
measures fear itself. Therefore, they suggest that information security researchers should
consider the full nomology of PMT constructs, as depicted in the figure below:

15

Figure 2.4

The Full Nomology of Protection Motivation Theory

Boss et al. (2015)
Protection Motivation in Uncertain Circumstances
Protection motivation researchers have been struggling with identifying the ideal
message characteristics of a fear appeal that can lead to the strongest form of protection
motivation behavior. In this regard, researchers have attempted to provide a
comprehensive framework to account for such issues. Although interesting, support for
this theory has been fraught with inconsistencies. In fact, it can be argued that predictions
from PMT can be more precise if the circumstances under which people are likely to
process potentially threatening information and the recommended responses are carefully
identified and controlled. “Uncertainty” is one of the most important and yet,
understudied such circumstances (Sorrentino & Short, 1986).
16

Along with any other affective or motivational element that could be innate in
each situation, there is also an informational element, the extent to which the situation
will resolve uncertainty about the self, the environment, or the outcome of any inclination
to act in the situation (Brouwers & Sorrentino, 1993). In this respect, Kagan (1972)
suggested that cognitive incompatibility, defined as a kind of incoherence and
discrepancy between two cognitions, leads a person to a state of uncertainty about the self
and the environment. Reducing such uncertainty then becomes a chief motive, along with
other motives. The issue of uncertainty can be analyzed from two different perspectives
including individuals’ uncertainty-orientation and various types of uncertainty.
Rokeach (1960) distinguished between people who do not usually appear to be
very fearful of uncertainty and are generally able to resolve it and people who find new
evidence or inconsistent information threatening. Sorrentino & Short (1986) argue that
uncertainty-oriented individuals are prompted in situations where there is a certain degree
of uncertainty about the self and the environment for them to resolve. Certainty-oriented
persons are in fact, more motivated where there is no substantial uncertainty about the
self or the environment.
Similarly, Sorrentino & Hewitt (1984) found that uncertainty-oriented individuals
choose to engage in an activity that could reduce uncertainty about the self, regardless of
the potential result. Certainty-oriented people, on the other hand, choose to engage in an
activity that could not necessarily resolve uncertainty. It can be assumed that certaintyoriented individuals do not tend to know much new information about the self, regardless
of the value of such information.
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Certainty-oriented people’s tendency to retain certainty or clarity related to their
current cognitions rather than trying to resolve uncertainty, has been studied in
information processing and persuasion. For example, Sorrentino et al. (1988) found that
uncertainty-oriented individuals increase their processing of arguments, and decrease
their use of heuristic cues, just as personal relevance increased.
In contrast, certainty-oriented individuals, however are more likely to use
heuristics, and to engage in less systematic processing, especially when personal
relevance increased. Additionally, such individuals are more likely to engage in
systematic processing and less likely to engage in heuristic processing than were
uncertainty-oriented people when personal relevance is low.
Sorrentino et al. (1992) demonstrate that whether the situation is associated with
uncertainty about the self or about the outcome, uncertainty-oriented people are
motivated to resolve the uncertainty but certainty-oriented people are motivated to avoid
the situation. Other studies suggest that uncertainty-oriented people prefer to deal directly
with uncertainty, whereas certainty-oriented individuals are more likely to be oriented to
the familiar and certain circumstances. These different tendencies intensify as the task
becomes more personally relevant to the individual (Driscoll et al. 1991).
This difference can also reflect in PMT context. For example, one can argue that
uncertainty-oriented persons are motivated to process information when it is personally
relevant and informative and it would be reasonable to assert that they will be likely to
follow the principles of PMT. A diagnostic task provides the opportunity to find more
information about the self or the environment, and threat increases the relevance of the
task to the person. Thus, as both the diagnosticity of the task and threat increase,
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uncertainty-oriented people are more likely to seek out as much accurate information as
possible (Brouwers & Sorrentino, 1993).
Certainty-oriented persons, on the other hand, should be less likely to track down
information as offered in a diagnostic task, and this inclination is more declared under
threat or high personal relevance. Hence, high threat and efficacy perceptions could lead
to the greatest difference in protection motivation where uncertainty-oriented individuals
are more likely to engage in activity than certainty-oriented persons. One may argue that
when either threat or efficacy is at a high level (not both), the situations are moderately
relevant and motivationally complicated, indicating that only one of these two variables
is motivating for each of the certainty-oriented or uncertainty-oriented persons.
Therefore, we can expect a moderate protection motivation for both groups. Where both
variables of threat and diagnosticity are low, it can be argued that certainty-oriented
people are more positively motivated than uncertainty-oriented people because
uncertainty-oriented persons are typically less interested than certainty-oriented persons
in non-diagnostic and nonthreatening tasks (Sorrentino & Short, 1986).
The complicated issue of uncertainty in protection motivation behavior can be
even more complex to understand as there are different types of uncertainty. Milliken
(1987) identified three types of uncertainties including state uncertainty, effect
uncertainty, and response uncertainty. State uncertainty is the perception that the
environment or a particular component of that environment is unpredictable. Effect
uncertainty refers to an individual’s inability to predict the nature of the impact of a
future state of the environment or of a certain environmental change. Finally, response
uncertainty is an individuals’ lack of knowledge of response options and/or an inability to
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predict the likely consequences of a certain response. Each of the three types of
uncertainty can also occur in IS context. A user may be unclear about what a technology
is for (state uncertainty), may be uncertain about what a technology can do for her (effect
uncertainty) and whether she can deal with potential changes of the technology, such as
upgrades or requirements to download software to support it following adoption
(response uncertainty) (Sun & Fang 2010).
Dynamics of Secure Behavior
Regarding the importance of safeguarding IT to decrease the threat of malicious
IT-related behaviors, numerous studies in the information security literature have focused
on secure behavior and its antecedents. Protection Motivation Theory explains that in the
threat appraisal process, individuals perceive a threat if they believe that they are
vulnerable to it and the negative outcomes are severe. The high degree of threat
perception induces coping appraisal, which is characterized by users evaluating the
degree to which the IT threat can be avoided by taking safeguarding measures.
However, users’ beliefs, attitudes, and appraisals are not static. Accordingly,
secure behaviors are subject to change as evidenced when drivers drive slower after
witnessing an accident on the road, but then may eventually return to their equilibrium
behavior. In the IT context, as users experience (directly or vicariously) a security threat
(e.g. data loss, computer virus infection, etc.), they tend to engage in improved security
hygiene (Mutchler & Warkentin, 2015), but often only for a limited time. In the
organizational setting, employees may increasingly fail to back up their data or scan for
viruses as the effect of security education wears off over time. Despite the importance
and prevalence of this phenomenon, IS security literature has been silent on how users’
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secure behaviors could be modified over time, possibly intensifying, diminishing, or even
stopping (Vedadi, 2016). Understanding the factors that influence these behavioral
dynamics is crucial.
There are several theoretical perspectives that explain such behavioral dynamics.
The Theory of Belief Updating (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) presents the theoretical
foundation for understanding the temporal dynamism of user evaluations. Per this theory,
individuals do not perceive an external impetus in its pure form. Instead, the prior
knowledge (anchor) is modified by the influence of following evidence (adjustment).
Similarly, the Cognition Change Model (Bhattacherjee & Premkumar, 2004) explains
why individuals’ beliefs and attitude change as they gain experience and feedback from a
behavior and new evidence when their initials expectations are disconfirmed
subsequently. Disconfirmation is the extent to which an event is evaluated as either
exceeding or falling short of expectations. Positive disconfirmation results when
perceived performance exceeds expectations, thereby causing satisfaction. “Negative
disconfirmation” occurs when performance falls below expectations, causing
dissatisfaction. Consequently, the updated perception of usefulness (at the post-adoption
stage) and the level of satisfaction predict users’ continuance intention. The following
figure depicts cognition change model:
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Figure 2.5

The Cognition Change Model

Bhattacherjee & Premkumar (2004)
As mentioned earlier, the initial security-related reaction of IT users to security
threats and secure behavior is important but the real value of these behaviors is dependent
upon their continuous and sustained practice. It can be argued that prior experience with
security threats is a crucial factor in continuous secure behavior because the users who
have already directly experienced a security-related problem are logically more prone to
hold on to their secure behavior than those who have not. Based on this fact, cognition
change model or at least some of its elements can explain the dynamics of secure
behavior to some extent.
Fundamentals of Herd Behavior
In a wide variety of social and economic situations, people are influenced in their
decision making by what other people around them are doing. For example, we usually
decide which restaurants to go based on how popular they seem to be (Banerjee, 1992).
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Keynes (1936) suggest that this is also how investors in asset markets often make
decisions. Similarly, in the other cases like fertility choices, it has been found that such
decisions (e.g. how many children to have) are substantially influenced by observing
what other people do in the same geographic area. This phenomenon can also occur in
other contexts such as citizens’ voting patterns, “hot” topics that researchers choose to
investigate, or IT users’ decision to join a certain online social network. Banerjee (1992)
further explained this phenomenon by making a hypothetical scenario about choosing a
restaurant:
“A lot of us have been in a situation where we need to choose between two
restaurants that are both unknown to us. Consider a situation where there are 100 people
who are all facing such a choice. There are two restaurants A and B next to each other
and we know that the prior probabilities are 51 percent for restaurant A being better and
49 percent for restaurant B being the better one. People enter the restaurants in
sequence, observe the choices of people before them, and choose a restaurant. Besides
knowing the prior probabilities, each person also gets the signal which says either A or B
is better (obviously, the signal could be wrong). It can also be assumed that each
person’s signal is of the same quality.
Now suppose that 99 out of the 100 people, received signals that B is better but
the one person whose signal favors A gets to choose first and goes to A. The second
person will now know that the first person had a signal that favored A, while her or his
own signal favors B. Since the signals are of equal quality, they effectively cancel out,
and the rational choice is to go by the prior probabilities and choose A. The second
person chooses A regardless of her or his signal. This choice provides no new
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information to the next person in line; the third person's situation is therefore the same as
that of the second person, and she should make the same choice and so forth.
Consequently, everybody ends up at restaurant A even if, given the aggregate
information, it is practically certain that B is better.”
An alternative explanation of this behavior, also known as herd behavior, which is
based on informational asymmetries, is suggested by Scharfstein & Stein (1990). This
explanation is focused on an agency problem, according to which agents receive rewards
for persuading a principal that they are right. Such distortion in incentives is important in
generating herd behavior. Conversely, in Banerjee’s model of herd behavior, agents
capture all the returns generated by their choice so that there is no considerable distortion
in incentives.
One of the most important conditions for thorough understanding of herd
behavior is distinguishing this phenomenon from similar concepts. The next few sections
are dedicated to this matter.
Herd Behavior vs. Network Externality
Network externality as one of the close concepts to herd behavior, refers to the
phenomenon that the value of a technology increases as the number of its users increases
(Li, 2004). This concept differs from herd behavior in several ways:
First, it is closely tied to the increasing value of a technology resulting from new
users. A potential user may know that her adoption decision can increase the value of a
certain technology to those who are already using it (e.g., friends connected through
Google+). But herd behavior does not necessarily have this kind of value-adding process.
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Alternatively, the main motivation behind herd behavior is to overcome uncertainty and
to avoid information search costs or being blamed for making a certain bad choice.
Second, in herd behavior, people interpret information through observing other
people’s decisions. Network externality, however, is the result of constant information
sharing among new and existing users.
Third, while herd behavior means that information is inferred from public or from
well-informed predecessors, network externality is mainly about the information inferred
from those who can benefit most from one’s decision.
Fourth, a decision made through herding is often fragile; whereas network
externality reinforces the value of a technology and makes the user base less fragile (Li,
2004).
Finally, network externality, unlike herd behavior which often happens with
dramatic burst of adopters, can have a chilling effect. That is, people may postpone their
initial adoption, waiting for more early adopters to provide them with more network
externality utility (Goldenberg et al. 2009).
Herd Behavior vs. Subjective Norms
Subjective norm is another concept related to herd behavior. Subjective norm is
defined as an individual’s perception that most of her important others think she should
or should not perform the behavior in question (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975). In addition,
Thompson et al. (1991) introduced a concept of a social norm and analyzed its similarity
to subjective norm. These concepts capture the element of social influence and explain
how a person thinks those important to her will judge her because of adopting a certain
technology (Venkatesh et al. 2003).
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Subjective norm is inherently different from herd behavior in several ways. First,
these two concepts differ in their sources of information. Subjective norm usually
emanates from someone’s reference group, consisting of those important to them. Also,
people in an individual’s reference group do not necessarily use the technology
themselves. On the other hand, herd behavior usually has a much more extensive
information source (e.g., prior users). Furthermore, in herd behavior context, an
individual follows those predecessors who have already adopted the technology. Second,
herding and subjective norm differ about the kind of obtained information and the
motivations of its acquisition. For instance, a person often gets information about the
norms via being cognizant of subjective norm. These norms are self-instructions to do
what is perceived to be appropriate by members of a circle of people in certain situations
(Triandis, 1980).
When it comes to subjective norm, people expect that the adoption decision may
later be judged by the reference group. They care how the use of a certain technology will
influence their image in their personal social circle (Moore & Benbasat 1991). Through
herd behavior, an individual gets such information about the value of a technology and
tries to avoid costs or blame for a bad choice. This person does not care about how the
people she follows judge her because of using a certain technology. In addition, herd
behavior and subjective norm are different in how information is acquired. Herd behavior
relies on “observation” of other people’s behavior, whereas subjective norm usually
hinges on messages received from significant others (Thompson et al. 1991).
The following table depicts the key differences between herd behavior and these
two similar concepts:
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Table 2.2

Differences Between Herd Behavior and Similar Concepts
Herd Behavior

Network Externality

Subjective Norm

A person follows
others when
adopting a
technology.

The value of a
technology
increases as the
number of
its users increases.

Information source

Prior adopters.

Those who can
benefit from the
new adoption of the
technology.

What information
is inferred from
others
How information
is
inferred from
others

Estimated value of
the
technology.

Benefits from more
adopters of the
technology.

A person’s
perception that
most people who
are important to
him/her think
he/she should or
should not perform
the behavior in
question.
People in an
adopter’s reference
group (important to
the adopter) who
may or may not
have adopted the
technology.
Others’
opinions/norms
about the adoption.

Observation.

Observation and
direct
communications.

Perceptions of how
others would think
about the behavior.

The more, the
stronger
influence of others.
However, the
informativeness of
predecessors may
be low.

In general, the more
prior
adopters, the
stronger the
influence of others,
and the higher
perceived value of
the technology.
However, network
externality is subject
to the chilling effect
and
network congestion.

No strong
relationship.
Limited to those
who are important
to the adopters.

Definition

The impact of the
number of others
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Table 2.2

(continued)

Motivations

To overcome
uncertainty and to
avoid costs or
blame for choice.

To enjoy the
increased value
associated with the
enlarged user base.

To avoid being
judged
unfavorably or in
the hope of being
judged favorably.

Long-term impact

Herds are often
fragile and later
reversals of herd
practices are
expected. On the
other hand, herding
practice may also
have
reasonable staying
power if the true
value of the adopted
practice is
ultimately revealed.

Network externality
can
strengthen the
perceived
value of a
technology and
can thus reinforce
the user
base.

Subjective norms
do not matter much
after the technology
is adopted.

Adapted from Sun (2013)
Herd Behavior vs. Informational Cascades
Both herd behavior and informational cascade have been regarded as pathological
phenomena because undesirable outcomes may occur despite rationality, and these may
be the norm in some circumstances. While these two terms are usually used
interchangeably, Smith & Sorensen (2000) argue that there is a significant difference
between them. An informational cascade occurs when an infinite sequence of people
completely ignore their own private information when making a decision, whereas herd
behavior takes place when an infinite sequence of people make a similar decision, but not
necessarily ignoring their private information (Celen & Kariv, 2004). In other words,
informational cascades are a special case of herd behavior.

28

In herd behavior, people choose the same action, but they may behave differently
from one another if the realization of their own private signals had been different.
However, in an informational cascade a person finds it optimal to follow the behavior of
her predecessors, regardless of her private signal, because their belief is so strongly held
that no other signal can outweigh it. Hence, an informational cascade indicates a herd but
a herd is not necessarily the result of an informational cascade (Celen & Kariv, 2004).
The practical importance of the distinction between cascades and herds is that in a
cascade, social learning finishes because individual behavior gets completely imitative
and obviously, uninformative. Conversely, in a herd, people become increasingly likely
to imitate each other but their behaviors may still provide information. Therefore, when
acting in a herd, a group settles on one pattern of behavior and simultaneously, the
behavior becomes fragile because a strong signal may abruptly and fundamentally shift a
behavior; however, a cascade is stable and no signal can lead to a change in the pattern of
behavior (Celen & Kariv, 2004).
Herd Behavior in IS Context
Herd Behavior in IS adoption can be described as the phenomenon that a user
follows other users when adopting a technology, even when their private information
might suggests doing something different. While imitation can be used as a strategy to
decide whether to adopt a technology, it can also include choosing between the adoption
and rejection of a certain technology. Similar decisions have been studied in existing herd
literature. Rao et al. (2001) argue that studies on herd behavior have been focused on
discrete decisions, such as whether invest or not invest on a certain project, or to adopt or
to reject a technology. In fact, the decision to adopt or reject a technology typifies a
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situation that can lead to herd behavior. Additionally, Duan et al. (2009) found that
Internet users’ choices of software significantly fluctuate when the download rankings of
the software products change, indicating that users are likely to follow the previous
adopters’ choices.
Herd Behavior involves both one’s own private information and one’s
observations of the actions of others. In a scenario, all people end up making the same
choice which is somewhat unrealistic because not everyone completely disregards his/her
private information when imitating others. More often, people depend on a combination
of their own information as well as their observations of the behavior of others. Thus,
herd behavior is “observed but is somewhat less widespread than is predicted by the
respective theories, with agents following their own signals more than the theory
predicts” (Hey & Morone 2004). Avery & Zemsky (1998) also showed that financial
agents often trade on the differences between their own information and that which is
publicly available.
Sun (2013) explains why users may consider including both the observations of
others and their own information in making a technology adoption decision. First, the
actions of other people may be considered less relevant. Observing other users’ behavior
usually conveys information that could be different from one’s own information.
The fact that so many users have adopted a certain technology may signify that
the technology is popular and useful to others. Moreover, a user’s own information
specifies how this technology can meet her own needs. Second, current users of a
technology may send mixed signals (adoption or rejection signals), indicating their
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contrasting perspectives regarding the technology and may cause one to question the
value of the technology by using her own information.
In this regard, Sun (2013) proposed two new concepts, namely “discounting one’s
own information” and “imitating others,” to explain herd behavior in technology adoption
context. He also elaborated the conditions under which herd behavior can happen in
technology adoption context, as well as how such behavior influences technology
adoption decision making, and how it impacts post-adoption use.
The findings of his longitudinal study suggested that the discounting one’s own
beliefs and the imitating others when adopting a new technology are triggered mainly
through observing prior adoptions and perceptions of uncertainty regarding the adoption
of new technology. The following figure depicts the relationship between the two main
triggers of herd behavior (uncertainty and observation) and the two components of herd
behavior (discounting own information and imitating others):

Figure 2.6

A Simple Nomological Network of Herd Behavior
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Sun (2013) found that herd behavior significantly impacts user technology
adoption; however, it does not necessarily lead to the collapse of the user base,
inconsistent with the herd literature in finance and economics. The next section further
elaborates the issue of herd behavior temporal dynamics.
Dynamics of Herd Behavior
The findings of Sun (2013) longitudinal study show that imitation could decrease
post-adoption regret and therefore, become a legitimate strategy for choosing a “good
enough” technology (which may not necessarily be the ideal option available). Users are
inclined to adjust their personal beliefs when showing herd behavior and to revive their
discounted initial beliefs to modify their beliefs about the technology at the post-adoption
stage.
In another study that is focused on understanding herd behavior in early adoption
of novel technologies and the dynamics of this phenomenon, Walden & Browne (2009)
developed and tested a model of observational learning to explain technology adoption
decisions. In other words, they simulated users’ technology adoption based on private
information and signals inferred from observation of the actions of predecessors.
Previous IS research has explained IT adoption in terms of benefits and costs, network
externalities, and social benefit-based herding. Their observational learning explanation
leveraged a modified version of the information cascade model of Bikhchandani et al.
(1992), which was previously discussed.
Decision makers are inclined to imitate each another, and at the same time, they
tend to do so in the correct direction (Sun, 2013). The probability of being in the correct
direction rises as more decisions are made rather than getting fixated to a steady state.
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Walden & Browne (2009) simulations indicate two reasons for to support this claim.
First, in their study, they allow for extreme observations in the signals. Additionally,
instead of limiting the decision makers to simple binary signals, they allow for signals to
come from a normal distribution, and thus, they can prefer one option a lot or a little or
any amount. Moreover, when decision makers reverse the prevailing herd direction, they
could reset the prior beliefs of the next decision maker (which could collapse incorrect
herds). Thus, the possibility of extreme signals will have a greater tendency to reverse
incorrect herds over time than to reverse correct herds. They found that people tend to
imitate each other and can sometimes make incorrect adoption decisions (e.g., adopting
an inferior technology).
Furthermore, incorrect herd-based decisions are more likely to be get reversed
than correct herd-based decisions. One of the most important findings of Walden &
Brown (2009) is that correct herds are “robust” in the face of contrary information. In
fact, imitation does not necessarily help to adopt a technology that best fits user’s needs
and brings beyond-expectation experiences; therefore, in case users in a herd get a signal
that indicates the existence of a better technology, the herd may not surely collapse. This
is inconsistent with what herd theory suggests in finance and economics context.
Research Model and Hypothesis Development
Based on the previous discussion of bounded rationality in behavioral security,
fundamentals of Protection Motivation Theory, and herd behavior, I propose the
following research model as depicted in the figure below:

33

Figure 2.7

The Research Model

In highly uncertain circumstances, users are less likely to be able to adequately
assess and understand the relationship between their adoption and the outcomes of that
adoption. This inhibits an accurate evaluation of a potential usefulness of a IT protective
technology. Therefore, it is a legitimate strategy for users to follow other users’ decision
in this regard and subsequently, to discount their own limited information and beliefs,
which to them, seems to be incomplete for making a good adoption decision. Thus, we
can hypothesize that:
H1: Users’ uncertainty about adopting a security technology is positively
associated with their discounting own information.
Furthermore, discounting one’s own information indicates that users rely less on
their initial information and beliefs and tend to rely more heavily on the insights from
observations of others’ behavior. Logically, the more a user discount her own limited
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information, the more likely she will tend to imitate what other users are doing. Thus, it’s
reasonable to hypothesize that:
H2: Discounting of own information could lead to tendency to imitate what other
people are doing.
In the finance and economics literature, there is sufficient evidence that many
investors mimic the investment decisions of other managers, only to avoid being
considered incapable, in case of poor return on investment (Scharfstein & Stein 1990). In
fact, individuals may prefer the odds of being wrong, along with everybody else to the
risk of providing an atypical prediction that ends up being the only incorrect forecast
(Graham, 1999). In the same way, in information security context, imitation denotes that
even when a security technology adopted by herding happens to be inefficient, it is still
acceptable than the circumstance where a user becomes the only one who makes the
wrong decision of not adopting an efficient IT security technology and then suffers
damage to her reputation. Therefore, we can hypothesize that:
H3: Imitating others is positively associated with a person’s intention to adopt a
recommended security action to protection from a security threat.
Consistent with PMT literature, it can be expected that beliefs regarding a certain
IT security technology to adequately provide protection, will increase in strength as the
threat of a related IT security threat becomes more probable to the user. In other words,
when users admit that they are susceptible to an IT security threat, they are likely to
engage in using a protective technology that is deemed to be effectual. As such, the
following hypothesis is offered:
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H4: Perceptions of threat susceptibility will positively influence perceptions of
response efficacy.
In line with PMT reasoning, as a security threat is perceived to be severe, an end
user will feel more likely to reach out for a recommended IT security solution to
effectively address the threat. From this argument, it can be argued that:
H5: Perceptions of threat severity will positively influence perceptions of
response efficacy.
According to PMT, moderate to high levels of response efficacy perceptions are
associated with positive tendency of protection from threat by which a recommended
technology is enacted (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Users will evaluate the capabilities
such technology and form a disposition toward the recommendation. Therefore, we can
hypothesize that:
H6: Response efficacy will have a positive effect on users’ intention to adopt the
recommended computer security action.
Herd behavior literature in finance and economics suggests that imitation usually
leads to negative disconfirmation because a person is more likely to generate an
unrealistic assessment of a decision and subsequently experience post decision regret
(Rao et al. 2001). In IS context though, the findings show that herds in technology
adoption, are not as fragile as herds in finance and economics area. For instance, the
findings of Sun (2013) longitudinal study show that imitation could decrease postadoption regret and therefore, become a legitimate strategy for choosing a “good enough”
technology (which may not necessarily be the ideal option available). Walden & Brown
(2009) also show that correct herds are “robust” in the face of contrary information. In
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fact, imitation does not necessarily help to adopt a technology that best fits user’s needs
and brings beyond-expectation experiences; therefore, in case users in a herd get a signal
that indicates the existence of a better technology, the herd may not surely collapse.
Therefore, I argue that:
H7: Imitating others at the adoptive stage is positively associated with
disconfirmation at the post-adoptive stage.
Consistent with Cognition Change Model (Bhattacherjee & Premkumar, 2004),
post-adoptive modified beliefs (the degree to which one perceives that a technology is
useful at the post-adoptive stage) are formed based on the initial beliefs at the adoptive
stage through belief-updating mechanism, which is how a user updates her beliefs based
on both old beliefs and the new information about the technology (Kim & Malhotra,
2005). Early beliefs can be selectively stored in one’s long term memory and thus can
also have distal effects on modified beliefs (Kim, 2009). Thus, we can hypothesize that:
H8: Response efficacy beliefs at the adoption stage are positively associated with
modified response efficacy beliefs at the post-adoption stage.
The relationships among Cognition Change Model constructs such as
disconfirmation, initial beliefs, modified beliefs, user satisfaction, and intention to
discontinue have been discussed earlier. Generally, when a user’s expectations about a
security technology are positively disconfirmed at the post-adoption stage, this
disconfirmation will lead to a higher level of modified beliefs and satisfaction with this
technology. Subsequently, these modified beliefs and satisfaction result in users’
continuance intention. It can thus be hypothesized that:
H9. Disconfirmation is positively associated with modified beliefs.
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H10. Disconfirmation is positively associated with user satisfaction.
H11. User satisfaction is positively associated with intention to continue.
H12. Modified beliefs are positively associated with intention to continue.
IS research support direct relationship between intention to use at the adoption
stage and intention to continue use at the post-adoption stage (Kim & Malhotra, 2005;
Kim, 2009; Sun, 2013). This relationship captures the sequential updating mechanism
which means that users form their subsequent intentions with respect to their previous
intentions that are stored in their long-term memory and can be recalled serving as the
input of subsequent intentions (Kim, 2009). Thus, it is reasonable to hold that intention to
use at the initial adoption stage can distally influence the continuance intention at the
post-adoption stage. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H13: Intention to adopt a recommended security action at the adoption stage is
positively associated with post-adoption continuance intention.
Users with higher perceptions of switching costs usually finds other options less
attractive, and eventually become less interested in other alternatives. In other words,
Kim & Son (2009) argue that the perceptions of switching costs increase, users’
inattentiveness to alternatives will increase. Marketing literature also suggests that
switching costs usually reduce the number of alternatives that will be considered by
customers, significant decrease efforts to look for alternatives, and diminish the
propensity to search for alternatives (e.g. Weiss & Heide, 1993; Heide & Weiss, 1995;
Zauberman, 2003). Overall, these findings and the logic behind the effect of switching
costs at the post-adoption stage can support the following hypothesis:
H14: Switching costs will be positively related to a user’s continuance intention.
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Similar to the relationship between response efficacy and modified response
efficacy and consistent with Cognition Change Model (Bhattacherjee & Premkumar,
2004), post-adoptive modified beliefs are formed based on the initial beliefs at the
adoptive stage through belief-updating mechanism, which is how users updates their
beliefs based on both old beliefs and the new information about the technology (Kim &
Malhotra, 2005). Early beliefs can be selectively stored in one’s long term memory and
thus can also have distal effects on modified beliefs (Kim, 2009). Consistent with IS
literature (Walden & Brown, 2009; Sun, 2013), imitation-based behaviors are generally
resistance to change and may last over time. Thus, we can hypothesize that:
H15: Imitation at the adoption stage are positively associated with modified
imitation at the post-adoption stage.
As mentioned earlier, in information security context, the tendency to imitate
other users in uncertain circumstances can influence users’ adoption of security
technologies. We can have the same argument for the post-adoptive stage as IT herds are
usually robust and, therefore, users may keep imitating others at the post-adoption stage.
Thus, we can hypothesize that:
H16: Modified imitation will be positively related to a user’s continuance
intention.
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The following table summarizes the list of hypotheses of this study:
Table 2.3

The List of Hypotheses

Number Hypothesis
H1
Users’ uncertainty about adopting a security technology is positively
associated with their discounting own information.
H2
Discounting of own information could lead to tendency to imitate what other
people are doing.
H3
Imitating others is positively associated with a person’s intention to adopt a
recommended security action to protection from a security threat.
H4
Perceptions of threat susceptibility will positively influence perceptions of
response efficacy.
H5
Perceptions of threat severity will positively influence perceptions of
response efficacy.
H6
Response efficacy will have a positive effect on users’ intention to adopt the
recommended computer security action.
H7
Imitating others at the adoptive stage is positively associated with
disconfirmation at the post-adoptive stage.
H8
Response efficacy beliefs at the adoption stage are positively associated with
modified response efficacy beliefs at the post-adoption stage.
H9
Disconfirmation is positively associated with modified beliefs.
H10
Positively disconfirmation is positively associated with user satisfaction.
H11
User satisfaction is positively associated with intention to continue.
H12
Modified beliefs are positively associated with intention to continue.
H13
Intention to adopt a recommended security action at the adoption stage is
positively associated with post-adoption continuance intention.
H14
Switching costs will be positively related to a user’s continuance intention.
H15
Imitation at the adoption stage are positively associated with modified
imitation at the post-adoption stage.
H16
Modified imitation will be positively related to a user’s continuance
intention.
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CHAPTER III
METHOD
In this chapter, I discuss the method used in this dissertation. First, I describe the
experimental design and flow of this research. Then, I present the construct definitions
and measurement items, with their corresponding sources. Next, the flow and steps of the
investigation, as well as the sampling frame are described. Finally, the data analysis
procedure is discussed.
Instrument Design
To test the conceptual model and hypotheses presented in Chapter II, I used the
classical experimental design. In this design, each participant is randomly assigned to one
of two groups: the control group and the treatment group. Using a field experiment
design, I tested the phenomena of interest: herd behavior and continuance. Through the
course of the experiment, participants answered items related to herd behavior, protection
motivation, and continuance intention. All items were designed to be randomized to
reduce order effect (Podsakoff, et al. 2003). Following rigorous survey development
guidelines (MacKenzie et al. 2011), constructs were appropriately and clearly defined
and items were sufficiently adapted to meet the context of this study.
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The Experimental Design
Establishing measurement validity of the research design is a necessary
requirement for any research study. Classical pretest-posttest control group designs have
been used to control for internal validity issues. In other words, the experimental
treatments will indeed cause changes in posttest measures. To eliminate any interaction
effects due to selection bias, subjects are sampled from various populations and randomly
assigned to both groups. Randomization decreases the influence of any internal validity
issues because any confounding variables are distributed across both groups.
The participants were recruited from the Qualtrics panel provider and then
participated in the experiment by completing an online Qualtrics survey and using a
password manager for a week. Then they provided their demographic information
including age, sex, and education level. The figure below for a graphical depiction of the
experimental design for the pilot and primary investigation, which will be discussed later:
Table 3.1

The Experimental Design
Phase II
(1 week later)

Phase I
Condition
Control Group

Treatment
Group

Pre-treatment
measures
1.Qualifying
question (prior
experience with
password
managers)
2.Demographic
information

Treatment
No
Yes
(providing facts
about the
growing
popularity of
Dashlane, to
trigger herd
mentality).
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Post-treatment
measures
1. Manipulation
check
2. Behavioral
intention
3. Herd behavior
items
4. PMT items

1.Disconfirmation
2.Modified beliefs
3. Modified
imitation
4. Satisfaction
5. Switching costs
6.Continuance
intention

The Treatment
The following is the structure of the narrative that the treatment group received:
•

The first paragraph discusses the threat of password theft.

•

The second paragraph briefly discusses the need for a password
management tool and presents Dashlane as an example.

•

The third section includes a list of herd-related factors about the
widespread use of Dashlane.

The control group subjects only received the first two paragraphs and did not
receive any information about the popularity and widespread use of a password manager
called Dashlane. The reason for choosing a password manager as the technology of focus
was that there is a high degree of uncertainty among IT users about these tools (in terms
of response efficacy); therefore, it had a good fit to the context of herd behavior study. It
should also be noted that this narrative was discussed and refined with an expert panel
team. This expert review panel was convened to provide additional ideas and insights that
would allow for the refinement of the narrative and instrument. This panel consisted of
six faculty members and Ph.D. students at Mississippi State University. These panelists
were regarded as knowledgeable in research instrument design and protection motivation
literature, having conducted several similar experimental studies involving the measures
used in this research. The panelists provided useful comments refining the wordings and
structure of the narrative. Finally, the full narrative was reviewed by several potential
subjects (non-academic) to ensure its clarity and cohesiveness:
Using strong passwords has always been one of the most important issues of data
security. Many users create security problems by using passwords that are too simple to
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ensure security or too complex to remember. Other users re-use the same password for
different websites, which also creates security problems, or make themselves vulnerable
to password theft by saving their passwords on their browsers.
A password manager is a software tool that helps you effectively and conveniently
store and organize passwords. A good example is Dashlane, which is a free, efficient and
easy-to-use password manager that can be comfortably integrated with most web
browsers and smartphones.
Here is the list of facts about Dashlane:
•

The number of Internet users who are using password managers is rapidly growing.

•

According to Download.com, Dashlane is one of the most downloaded password
managers.

•

The password manager market is expected to increase from $311 million in 2014 to $710
million by 2019.

•

1 out of 3 Internet users is actively using password manager tools.

•

Other reports show that the vast majority of Internet users are planning to adopt
password managers in near future.

•

Leading analyst firms have predicted that the number of companies throughout the world
that are planning to invest in password managers, and especially in Dashlane,
will exponentially grow in near future.
Construct Measurement
This research is extensively grounded the following theories: Herd Theory,
Protection Motivation Theory, and Cognition Change Model (Extended Disconfirmation
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Theory). The constructs measured in this study were mainly adapted from these theories.
Measurement items for these constructs were primarily adapted from previously validated
multi-item scales in information systems literature. The following section presents the
construct definitions, measurement items and their correspondent sources:
Herd Behavior Constructs
Perceived Uncertainty (UNC)
Definition: the degree to which one is unable to accurately predict the issues
related to the adoption of a technology due to imperfect information (Sun, 2013).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. I am NOT sure what Dashlane is about and what it can do for me.
2. I feel uncertain whether my needs when logging onto websites securely could
be met by using Dashlane.
3. I feel uncertain whether I would be able to respond appropriately to any
changes/upgrades of Dashlane.
4. I feel that using Dashlane involves a high degree of uncertainty.
Imitating Others (IMI)
Definition: the degree to which one follows previous adopters to adopt a certain
form of technology (Sun, 2013).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. It seems that Dashlane is a widely-used password manager, therefore I would
like to use it too.
2. I follow others in deciding to use Dashlane.
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3. I would choose to use Dashlane because many others are already using it.
Discounting Own Information (DOI)
Definition: the degree to which one disregards his/her own beliefs about a
technology when making an adoption decision (Sun, 2013).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. I don’t fully trust my own thinking about how Dashlane could work for me.
2. I would not necessarily follow my own thoughts about Dashlane’s features.
3. I would not rely only on my own information about how Dashlane works.
Protection Motivation Constructs
Protection Motivation (Behavioral Intention) (BI)
Definition: Users’ intention to use a recommended security technology (Johnston
& Warkentin, 2010).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. I intend to use Dashlane in future.
2. I plan to use Dashlane soon.
3. I predict I will use Dashlane soon.
4. I expect to adopt Dashlane soon.
Threat Severity (TSEV)
Definition: the degree to which a user believes a security threat could have severe
consequences (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. If my passwords were stolen, lost, or forgotten, the consequences would be severe.
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2. If my passwords were stolen, lost, or forgotten, the consequences would be serious.
3. If my passwords were stolen, lost, or forgotten, the consequences would be significant.
Threat Susceptibility (TSUS)
Definition: refers to users’ perception about the probability of suffering from an
IT security threat (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. My passwords are at risk of being stolen, lost, or forgotten.
2. It is likely that my passwords will be stolen, lost, or forgotten.
3. It is possible that my passwords will be stolen, lost, or forgotten.
Response Efficacy (RE)
Definition: the degree to which an individual believes the response to be effective
in alleviating a threat (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. Using Dashlane works for password protection.
2. Using Dashlane is effective for password protection.
3. By using Dashlane, my passwords are more likely to be protected.
Cognition Change Model Constructs
Continuance Intention (CONT)
Definition: Users intention to continue using a technology (Bhattacherjee, 2001).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. I intend to continue using Dashlane rather than discontinue its use.
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2. My intentions are to continue using Dashlane rather than use any alternative
means.
3. I would like to continue my use of Dashlane.
Satisfaction (SAT)
Definition: Users' affect with (feelings about) using a technology (Bhattacherjee,
2001).
Measurement Scale (Semantic Differential Scale, 7-Point Likert Scale):
How do you feel about your overall experience of password manager use?
I am ….. with my use of Dashlane:
1. Extremely displeased ... Extremely pleased.
2. Extremely frustrated ... Extremely contented.
3. Extremely terrible ... Extremely delighted.
4. Extremely dissatisfied ... Extremely satisfied.
Modified Response Efficacy (ModRE)
Definition: as the degree to which one perceives that a technology will be useful
at the post-adoptive stage (Bhattacherjee & Premkumar, 2004).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. Using Dashlane improves my performance in managing my passwords.
2. Using Dashlane increases my productivity in managing my passwords.
3. Using Dashlane enhances my effectiveness in managing my passwords.
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Modified Imitation (ModIMI)
1. It seems that Dashlane is a widely-used password manager, therefore I would
like to continue using it.
2. I follow others to continue to use Dashlane.
3. I would choose to continue to use Dashlane because many others are already
using it.
Disconfirmation (DISC)
Definition: the degree to which one believes that the observed performance of a
technology is better than early expectations (Bhattacherjee & Premkumar, 2004).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Likert Scale where 1 indicates “much worse than
expected,” 4 indicates “neutral,” and 7 indicates “much better than expected.”):
Compared to my initial expectations, the ability of Dashlane_____
1. to improve my password management performance was______
2. to increase my password management productivity was______
3. to enhance my password management effectiveness was______
4. to be useful for password management was______
Switching Costs (SW)
Definition: The extent to which a customer feels dependent on a service because
of economic, social or psychological investments that would become useless in other
services (Kim & Son, 2009).
Measurement Scale (7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale):
1. Switching to a new password manager would involve some hassle.
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2. Some problems may occur if I switch to another password manager.
3. It would be complex to change my password manager.
Manipulation Checks
The following manipulation check is used to ensure that subjects paid attention to
the narrative:
•

What was the name of the password manager that was discussed in the
previous page? (Radio box: LastPass, Dashlane, iPassword)

The second manipulation check is used to determine whether subjects’ perception
of the independent variable in each group were manipulated in the intended manner and
that the experimental treatment was indeed effective. In other words, these checks
indicate whether the experimental manipulation was indeed effective in providing strong
evidence for inferring causality, thus proving that the levels of a treatment were
sufficiently different (Bagozzi, 1977; Marett, 2015).
•

Dashlane seems to be a widely-used password manager. (used in both pilot
and main study; 7-Point Agree/Disagree Likert Scale)
Pilot Study

The experiment was created and administered using the Qualtrics survey
platform. The participants were recruited and then participated in the experiment by
completing an online Qualtrics survey, receiving a certain degree of experimental
stimulus and, using a password manager for a week. They were randomly assigned to
both groups of the experiment. Reliability and validity and the application of attention
and manipulation checks were tested after the pilot study. Reliability is demonstrated
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when the reliability estimate for each construct is above 0.70. The manipulation check
was tested using an independent t-test. To assess construct validity, the responses were
analyzed using exploratory factor analysis. Convergent validity is demonstrated when
items of the same construct correlate at a significant level with each other (Straub et al.
2004; Hair et al. 2010). In exploratory factor analysis, item loadings greater than 0.70
indicate convergent validity. Discriminant validity is present when items of one construct
do not significantly correlate with items of another construct. In exploratory factor
analysis, discriminant validity is demonstrated when items cross-load on different factors
with item loadings less than 0.40 (Straub et al. 2004; Hair et al. 2010). SPSS v23 is used
at this stage. The goal is to collect about 100 responses at this stage.
Primary Investigation
After the pilot test, the primary experiment was conducted to empirically test the
model fit, construct validity, and the hypotheses discussed in Chapter II. This research
seeks to capture the subjects’ perceptions related to users’ pre-adoption and post-adoption
perceptions about a security technology, based on manipulating herd-related factors.
McGrath (1995) argues that experiments allow researchers to reach maximum precision
in measurement and control behaviors by concocting the situation or behavior, defining
rules, and then evaluating behavior.
For this study, any Internet user with no or little experience with using password
managers was qualified to participate in the first phase of the experiment. Those subjects
(in both groups) who use a password manager, called Dashlane, were qualified to
participate in the second phase of the experiment. Ultimately, the data collected from
subjects who did not participate in the second round of the experiment were discarded.
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I purchased panel data from Qualtrics, which is a professional research company
and helps researchers find respondents for their studies. Buying panel data is one of three
main methods of data collection for behavioral researchers, besides online crowd
sourcing markets and college students (Steelman et al. 2014). For example, Bulgurcu et
al. (2010), Barlow et al. (2013) and Willison et al. (2016) used panel data to investigate
information security policy compliance. The rest of this section discusses the process of
assessing model fit, construct validity, controlling for common method bias and data
analysis.
The Model Fit
Using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), I assessed measurement model fit. In
accordance with generally acceptable levels, I evaluated the model fit indices to
determine the measurement model was a good fit to the data. To establish good fit, χ2
(chi-square) is measured and the χ2 index (χ2/df) is computed. The χ2 index is better
measurement of fit than χ2 because it is less sensitive to sample size. The χ2 index should
be below 5 for acceptable fit (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) or below 3 for acceptable fit
(Kline, 1998). Additional goodness of fit indices including Incremental Fit Index (IFI),
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) are also used. Previous research
has set the general guideline that these statistics should be greater than 0.90 (Bentler,
1992; Chin & Todd, 1995). Another fit index evaluated in this study is the Root Mean
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). A general cutoff criterion for good fit is less
than 0.08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1992).
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Construct Validity
Convergent and discriminant validity of the measures were then assessed using
confirmatory factor analysis. Convergent validity is when items of the same construct
should correlate at a significant level with each other (Straub et al. 2004). Item loadings
greater than 0.70 and Average Varience Extracted (AVE) above 0.50 indicate convergent
validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Discriminant validity states that items of one
construct do not significantly correlate with items of another construct (Straub et al.
2004). Discriminant validity is confirmed by creating the square root of average variance
explained statistics and comparing them against correlation measures of other constructs.
Additionally, if AVE values are above .5, it indicates convergent validity and if this value
is higher than both Maximum Shared Variance (MSV) and Average Shared Variance
(ASV), we have sufficient evidence of discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981;
Hair et al. 2010).
Common Method Bias
Common method bias occurs when both the predictor and outcome variables are
collected using the same instrument and at a single point in time rather than
longitudinally (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This bias could lead to spurious correlation among
the constructs. This bias, also known as common method bias, can be addressed both
procedurally and statistically. The multistage data collection of this research can
significantly reduce this bias but still, the following procedural techniques were used to
further minimize common method bias:
•

Temporal separation of measurement,

•

Ensuring subjects about the anonymity of the survey, and
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•

Randomizing the order of the items.

Additionally, to statistically address common method bias, I included a single
unmeasured latent method factor in the CFA model. Podsakoff et al. (2003) specifies that
this unmeasured latent method factor should have a relationship with every scale item to
account for any systematic bias due to method. The variance of this unmeasured latent
method factor was set to 1 and regression weights for all relationships to this variable are
constrained equally. A confirmatory factor analysis should be performed with and
without a common method factor to determine the presence of common method bias. In
order to provide sufficient evidence that common method bias is not a substantial
concern, results of the analysis should indicate no significant difference (χ2/df < 3.84).
Schwarz et al. (2017) found that this method can effectively detect method biases that are
caused by emotions, major life events, scale format, item priming and embeddedness.
Data Analysis
Data analysis for testing the hypotheses was conducted using covariance-based
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) in AMOS v24. SEM is a second-generation
statistical modeling technique that is better than comparable multiple regression
techniques because it enables researchers to answer a set of interrelated research
questions in a single, systematic, and comprehensive analysis (Gefen et al. 2000). For
example, measurement errors are an integral part of the model and factor analysis is
combined in one operation with hypothesis testing (Gefen et al. 2000). As mentioned
before, there are two groups in this study: control and treatment; therefore, data is
analyzed using two-group analysis in order to compare the statistical differences between
these two groups. In this regard, the results of testing the hypothesized relationships in
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the model, fit statistics of the structural model, and the path estimates are reported for
both groups. The next chapter presents the results from the statistical analyses for both
the preliminary investigation and main investigation.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I present the data analysis process and results. First, I describe the
results of the reliability analysis, principal component analysis, and manipulation check.
Then, I describe the main study including participants’ demographics, confirmatory
factor analysis including item descriptives, measurement invariance, construct reliability
and validity. Then, I detail the results of the structural analysis including model fit, path
estimates, and test of control variables in the model.
Pilot Study
Prior to conducting the main study, a pilot study was conducted to test item
reliability, factor loadings, and the manipulation check. In the pilot study, I collected 103
usable responses from mTurk workers for the Phase 1 survey. The following are the key
characteristics of the dataset:
•

53 participants in the control group; 50 participants in the treatment group

•

Average age equals 34, and

•

60 male and 43 female respondents.

Then, I ran three tests before collecting Phase 2 data. First, I tested the
manipulation check item. The independent t-test results show that there is a significant
difference between the two groups in terms of their understanding about the widespread
use of Dashlane. Table 4.1 shows the results:
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Table 4.1

Manipulation Check Results

t-value
-2.831

Degrees of freedom
101

p-value
.006

The second test was the Cronbach’s validity test, using SPSS v23. Table 4.2
depicts the results:
Table 4.2

Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Test

Construct
Protection motivation (BI)
Threat severity
Threat susceptibility
Response efficacy
Perceived uncertainty
Discounting own information
Imitation

Cronbach’s Alpha
.96
.91
.83
.88
.85
.83
.91

Finally, I ran a Principal Factor Analysis to test the items loading and crossloadings using Varimax rotation and with fixing the number of factors to 7 (the number
of constructs in Phase I survey). Table 4.3 shows the results:
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Table 4.3

Principal Component Analysis

1
2
BI1
.85
BI2
.89
BI3
.89
BI4
.92
UNC1
.79
UNC2
.81
UNC3
.77
UNC4
.81
DOI1
.40
DOI2
DOI3
DOI4
IMI1
IMI2
.44
IMI3
RE1
RE2
RE3
TSUS1
TSUS2
TSUS3
TSEV1
TSEV2
TSEV3
The values are suppressed to .4.

3

4

5

6

7

.72
.79
.81
.69
.79
.73
.86
.74
.78
.83
.83
.79
.83
.89
.87
.89

After 1 week, only 37 respondents participated in the Phase II survey. The sample
size was too small for conducting Principal Component Analysis for Time 2 constructs
but I ran a Cronbach’s reliability analysis with the following results in Table 4.4:
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Table 4.4

Time 2 Constructs Cronbach’s Alpha

Construct
Disconfirmation
Modified Response Efficacy
Satisfaction
Switching Cost
Modified Imitation
Continuance Intention

Cronbach’s Alpha
.94
.91
.93
.83
.95
.95

Regarding the fact that manipulation was effective, item loadings were significant
and there was no issue with reliability, therefore, I proceeded to the main study.
Main Study
In the main data collection stage, I collected more data from Amazon Mechanical
Turk Masters and ultimately managed to collect 158 usable responses. Because this
sample size was insufficient for conducting a robust Confirmatory Factor Analysis and
Structural Analysis, I also collected 56 completed and usable response from a Qualtrics
panel, resulting in 214 usable responses in total. The following are the key characteristics
of the dataset:
•

107 participants in the control group; 107 participants in the treatment
group

•

Average age equals 39, and

•

125 male and 89 female respondents.

Measurement Invariance
Because I collected data from two different sources (Amazon Mechnical Turk
Masters and Qualtrics Panel), I needed to conduct measurement invariance tests before
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pooling the data from these sources. In order to do this, I conducted configural and metric
invariance tests.
Configural invariance is established when the unconstrained model has good fit
(Ellis et al., 2008). Therefore, configural invariance is established because the
unconstrained model has good fit as indicated previously. I found good fit in this model
as (1) χ2/df is under 3 (1.63), (2), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and Comparative Fit Index
(CFI) are greater than .90 (.907 and .904 accordingly)., and (3) Root Mean Square Error
of Approximation (RMSEA) is less than .07 (.055).
Additionally, metric invariance is established when the measurement weights χ2
statistic is not significant (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). The results from a chisquare difference test indicate metric invariance between the groups (df = 30; χ2 = 38.47;
p-value =.138).
Item Descriptives
After ensuring measurement invariance, I pooled the data and proceeded to
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Before that, I calculated the items’ average and standard
deviation as presented in the Table 4.5:
Table 4.5

Item Descriptives
Item
TSUS1
TSUS2
TSUS3
TSEV1
TSEV2
TSEV3
RE1
RE2
RE3

Average
5.09
4.33
4.82
5.43
5.46
5.23
5.29
5.24
5.34
60

Std. Deviation
1.41
1.52
1.48
1.48
1.48
1.41
1.37
1.25
1.29

Table 4.5

(continued)
UNC1
UNC2
UNC3
UNC4
DOI1
DOI2
DOI3
IMI1
IMI2
IMI3
DISC1
DISC2
DISC3
DISC4
SAT1
SAT2
SAT3
SAT4
SW1
SW2
SW3
ModRE1
ModRE2
ModRE3
CONT1
CONT2
CONT3
ModIMI1
ModIMI2
ModIMI3
B1
B2
B3
B4

3.29
3.09
3.63
3.02
3.05
3.23
3.88
4.30
4.56
4.04
5.01
5.08
5.07
5.15
5.25
5.23
5.12
5.06
4.72
4.24
4.10
5.27
5.12
5.27
4.66
4.78
4.74
3.68
3.90
3.83
4.45
4.31
4.45
4.34

1.73
1.65
1.70
1.71
1.65
1.54
1.73
1.74
1.64
1.72
1.23
1.31
1.20
1.32
1.39
1.37
1.40
1.25
1.52
1.51
1.57
1.41
1.43
1.43
1.79
1.75
1.77
1.79
1.75
1.76
1.60
1.59
1.66
1.67
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis
I assessed Confirmatory Factor Analysis using AMOS v24. This analysis included
the assessment of factor loadings, model fit, construct reliability, convergent validity,
discriminant validity, and the test of common method bias.
Factor Loadings
Table 4.6 depicts items’ factor loadings:
Table 4.6

Standardized Regression Weights
Item
TSUS1
TSUS2
TSUS3
TSEV1
TSEV2
TSEV3
RE1
RE2
RE3
UNC1
UNC2
UNC3
UNC4
DOI1
DOI2
DOI3
IMI1
IMI2
IMI3
DISC1
DISC2
DISC3
DISC4
SAT1
SAT2
SAT3
SAT4
SW1

Loading
.72
.75
.86
.88
.79
.93
.87
.89
.76
.80
.76
.83
.77
.86
.85
.69
.90
.91
.89
.94
.90
.88
.89
.93
.93
.89
.90
.76
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Table 4.6 (continued)
SW2
SW3
ModRE1
ModRE2
ModRE3
CONT1
CONT2
CONT3
ModIMI1
ModIMI2
ModIMI3
B1
B2
B3
B4

.85
.86
.94
.89
.91
.95
.95
.98
.87
.93
.92
.93
.93
.96
.96

Measurement Model Fit
In accordance with generally acceptable levels, I evaluated the model fit indices
to determine the measurement model was a good fit to the data. To establish good fit, χ2
(chi-square) is measured and the χ2 index (χ2/df) is computed. The χ2 index is better
measurement of fit than χ2 because it is less sensitive to sample size. The χ2 index should
be below 5 for acceptable fit (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) or below 3 for acceptable fit
(Kline, 1998). Additional goodness of fit indices including Incremental Fit Index (IFI),
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) are also used. Previous research
has set the general guideline that these statistics should be greater than 0.90 (Bentler,
1992; Chin & Todd, 1995). The other fit indices evaluated in this study (badness-of-fit
indices) are the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and Standardized
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) which need to be less than 0.08 (Browne &
Cudeck, 1992). Table 4.7 depicts the results:
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Table 4.7

Measurement Model Fit Statistics

Goodness of Fit Statistic
χ2
Degrees of freedom (df)
χ2 Index (χ2/df)
Incremental Fit Index (IFI)
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA)
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)

Recommended
Value
≤3
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90
≤ .06

Calculated
Value
1260
782
1.61
.95
.94
.95
.05

≤ .08

.04

Construct Reliability and Validity
All constructs in the model had an acceptable level of reliability (≥ 0.70) (Fornell &
Larcker, 1981; Mackenzie et al. 2011). Initial reliability scores were obtained through
reliability analysis by computing composite reliability.
Next, convergent and discriminant validity of the measures were assessed using
Confirmatory Factor Analysis in AMOS v24. Convergent validity is demonstrated when
items of the same construct correlate at a significant level with each other (Straub et al.
2004). Item loadings greater than 0.70 and Average Variance Extracted above 0.50
indicate convergent validity (Gefen et al. 2000).
All items loaded significantly on their corresponding construct with loadings
greater than 0.70 (except DOI3 with .69 factor loading). Additionally, all constructs had
an average variance extracted greater than 0.50. Therefore, the results indicate convergent
validity.
Discriminant validity is present when items of one construct do not significantly
correlate with items of another construct (Straub et al. 2004). Discriminant validity is
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confirmed by creating the square root of average variance extracted statistics and
comparing them against correlation measures of other constructs. The square root of
average variance extracted was greater than inter-construct correlations; therefore, the
results indicate discriminant validity.
Table 4.8 shows that Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted
(AVE), Maximum Shared Variance (MSV) and Average Shared Variance (ASV), and
squared root of AVEs (the values on the diagonal):
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BI
TSUS
TSEV
RE
UNC
DOI
IMI
DISC
ST
SW
ModRE
CONT
ModIMI

Table 4.8

.97
.82
.90
.88
.87
.85
.93
.94
.95
.86
.93
.97
.93

CR

.90
.61
.76
.71
.62
.65
.81
.82
.84
.68
.83
.92
.83

AVE

.47
.24
.24
.37
.38
.38
.47
.81
.81
.13
.80
.76
.45

MSV

BI

.17 .95
.08 .38
.04 .18
.13 .61
.06 -.31
.06 .03
.16 .68
.26 .40
.26 .36
.04 .11
.27 .46
.26 .41
.21 .48

ASV

.78
.49
.45
-.00
.11
.38
.14
.09
.21
.16
.18
.25

TSUS

RE

.87
.39 .84
.02 -.36
-.09 -.23
.15 .56
.07 .27
.04 .24
.04 .06
.11 .33
.11 .31
.10 .23

TSEV

.79
.62
-.18
-.01
-.04
.21
-.11
-.02
.09

UNC

.81
.21
.15
.10
.22
.10
.14
.33

DOI

Construct Reliability, Convergent and Discriminant Validity

.90
.35
.37
.22
.39
.41
.53

IMI

.90
.90
.16
.89
.82
.64

DISC

.91
.16
.89
.87
.66

ST

.82
.15
.25
.36

SW

.91
.85
.62

ModRE

.96
.67

CONT

.91

ModIMI

Common Method Bias
Before testing the structural model, I minimized and controlled for common method bias
using procedural and statistical methods (Podsakoff et al., 2003). I used several
procedural remedies such as:
•

Temporal separation of construct measurement,

•

Ensuring participants of the anonymity of their identity

•

Item randomization

•

Using attention checks

Additionally, I used Common Latent Factor (CLF) method as a post hoc, statistical
method to detect common method bias. The common latent factor should have a
relationship with every scale item to account for any systematic bias due to method. The
variance of this unmeasured latent method factor is set to one and regression weights for
all relationships to this variable are constrained equally. A confirmatory factor analysis
was performed with and without a common method factor to determine the presence of
common method bias. The results of the analysis showed significant difference because
the chi-square difference was more than 3.84. Table 4.9 shows the model fit difference
between the measurement model with and without the unmeasured latent construct:
Table 4.9

The Chi-square different between the two models

Model
Unconstrainted

Without CLF
χ2
df
1260
782
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With CLF
χ2
1230

df
781

In order to find the items that caused the significant bias, I ran the measurement
model 43 times (the number of items in the model) and compared the Chi-square
difference between the models with and without CLF. I finally found 5 items that
accounted for the significant difference between the Chi-square values. These items were
TSEV2, DOI3, BI3, SAT4 and UNC2.
After dropping these items, the Chi-square between the two models became
insignificant (Chi-square difference = 3.6, df difference = 1) as follows:
Table 4.10

The Chi-square different between the two models

Model
Unconstrainted

Without CLF
χ2
df
857.4
587

With CLF
χ2
853.8

df
586

To make sure that dropping these items has not negatively influenced constructs
reliability and validity, I had to redo these tests again with the remaining items. The
analysis showed that factor loadings are still above .7. Also, composite reliability values
are above .7, AVEs are above .5 and there is still evidence for discriminant validity. The
full tables of these analyses are in the appendix section.
Structural Analysis
After the measurement model analysis and making sure that there is an acceptable
level of model fit, construct reliability, and validity as well as detecting and eliminating
the sources of common method bias, I proceeded to the analysis of the structural model.
In this section, I discuss the fit statistics of the structural model, the path estimates of the

68

control group and treatment group models, and the effect of control variables on the
dependent variables in the model.
Structural Model Fit
Structural model fit is determined by examining the same fit statistics examined in
the measurement model. The analysis results, as shown in the Table 4.11, indicated good
fit because all fit statistics, except TLI and SRMR, were within recommended levels.
Table 4.11

Structural Model Fit Statistics

Goodness of Fit Statistic
χ2
Degrees of freedom (df)
χ2 Index (χ2/df)
Incremental Fit Index (IFI)
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)
Comparative Fit Index
(CFI)
Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)
Root Mean Square
Residual (SRMR)

Recommended Value
≤3
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90

Calculated Value
2095
1286
1.62
.90
.89
.90

≤ .06

.05

≤ .08

.16

Path Estimates
Data analysis for testing the hypotheses was conducted using covariance-based
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) in AMOS v24. As mentioned before, there are two
groups in this study: control and treatment; therefore, data is analyzed using two-group
analysis in order to compare the statistical differences between these two groups. For this
purpose, I used a dummy coded variable to split the dataset into two groups.
Table 4.12 depicts the path estimates in both groups:
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Table 4.12

Path Estimates
Control Group

Hypothesis

Std.
Estimate

t-value

p-value

Treatment Group
Std.
t-value
p-value
Estimate

H1: UNC → DOI
.77
8.25
***
.34
3.14
.002**
H2: DOI → IMI
.09
.90
.36 (n.s) .26
2.22
.02*
H3: IMI → BI
.51
5.77
***
.63
8.01
***
H4: TSUS → RE
.35
2.93
.003**
.31
2.58
.01*
H5: TSEV → RE
.21
1.91
.056 (n.s) .29
2.51
.01*
H6: RE → BI
.37
4.18
***
.38
4.53
***
H7: IMI → DISC
.49
5.08
***
.31
3.19
.001**
H8: RE → ModRE
.15
2.79
.005**
.05
1.11
.26 (n.s)
H9: DISC → ModRE
.89
13.22
***
.92
12.48 ***
H10: DISC → SAT
.89
12.80
***
.92
13.08 ***
H11: SAT → CONT
.59
7.22
***
.37
2.87
.004**
H12: ModRE → CONT .30
3.72
***
.45
3.36
***
H13: BI → CONT
.05
1.20
.23 (n.s) .00
.05
.95 (n.s)
H14: SW → CONT
.06
1.49
.13 (n.s) .11
1.77
.07 (n.s)
H15: IMI → ModIMI
.62
6.56
***
.51
5.28
***
H16: ModIMI → CONT .12
2.68
.007**
.12
1.93
.053 (n.s)
Note: n.s = non-significant, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; UNC = Perceived
Uncertainty, DOI = Discounting Own Information, IMI = Imitation, BI = Behavioral
Intention or Protection Motivation, TSUS = Threat Susceptibility, TSEV = Threat
Severity, RE = Response Efficacy, DISC = Disconfirmation, ModRE = Modified
Response Efficacy, ModIMI = Modified Imitation, SW = Switching Cost, SAT =
Satisfaction, CONT = Continuance Intention,
Table 4.13 shows the Squared Multiple Correlation (or R2) values:
Table 4.13

Squared Multiple Correlations (R2)

Construct
Discounting own information
Imitation
Disconfirmation
Response efficacy
Protection motivation (BI)
Modified imitation
Modified response efficacy
Satisfaction
Continuance intention

Control Group
.595
.009
.244
.240
.406
.385
.815
.809
.852
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Treatment Group
.117
.069
.100
.282
.542
.265
.866
.853
.704

Table 4.14 summarizes the hypothesis testing results for both groups:
Table 4.14

Hypotheses and Results
Supported?
Control Group Treatment Group

Hypothesis

H1: Users’ uncertainty about adopting a security
technology is positively associated with their discounting
own information.
H2: Discounting of own information could lead to
tendency to imitate what other people are doing.
H3: Imitating others is positively associated with a
person’s intention to adopt a recommended security
action to protection from a security threat.
H4: Perceptions of threat susceptibility will positively
influence perceptions of response efficacy.
H5: Perceptions of threat severity will positively
influence perceptions of response efficacy.
H6: Response efficacy will have a positive effect on
users’ intention to adopt the recommended computer
security action.
H7: Imitating others at the adoptive stage is positively
associated with disconfirmation at the post-adoptive
stage.
H8: Response efficacy beliefs at the adoption stage are
positively associated with modified response efficacy
beliefs at the post-adoption stage.
H9: Disconfirmation is positively associated with
modified beliefs.
H10: Positively disconfirmation is positively associated
with user satisfaction.
H11: User satisfaction is positively associated with
intention to continue.
H12: Modified beliefs are positively associated with
intention to continue.
H13: Intention to adopt a recommended security action at
the adoption stage is positively associated with postadoption continuance intention.
H14: Switching costs will be positively related to a user’s
continuance intention.
H15: Imitation at the adoption stage are positively
associated with modified imitation at the post-adoption
stage.
H16: Modified imitation will be positively related to a
user’s continuance intention.
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Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Figure 4.1 depicts the structural model analysis for the control and treatment
group:

Figure 4.1
Path Model with Hypothesis Testing Results
Note: n.s = non-significant, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, dotted lines = unsupported paths,
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Control Variables
Including control variables in the structural analysis reduces biased estimates by
removing confounding effects. Therefore, I collected information about the subjects’ age
and gender. In the Structural Equation Modeling using AMOS v24, I included these two
variables and added a direct relationship to all the dependent variables in the model (both
control and treatment groups). Furthermore, I added a covariance relationship between
these control variables and all independent constructs. Then, I conducted Structural
Equation Modeling to determine whether each of the control variables had an influence
on the dependent variables in the model.
Table 4.15 depicts the control variable path estimates:
Table 4.15

Control Variables Path Estimates

Control Variable
Relationship

Control Group

Treatment Group

Std. Estimate

t-value

p-value

Std.
Estimate

t-value

p-value

Age → DOI

.13

1.84

.064 (n.s)

-.17

-1.75

Age → IMI

-.12

-1.19

.233 (n.s)

-.11

-1.19

Age → RE

.18

2.01

.044*

.05

.60

Age → BI

-.01

-.14

.885 (n.s)

.01

.24

Age → DISC

.08

1.00

.313 (n.s)

-.10

-1.06

Age → ModIMI

-.01

-.22

.822 (n.s)

-.16

-1.88

Age → ModRE

.02

.40

.687 (n.s)

-.02

-.44

Age → SAT

-.01

-.28

.777 (n.s)

-.01

-.32

Age → CONT

.09

2.19

.028*

.09

.20

Gender → DOI

.13

1.93

.053 (n.s)

.18

1.90

.079
(n.s)
.234
(n.s)
.546
(n.s)
.807
(n.s)
.288
(n.s)
.060
(n.s)
.658
(n.s)
.748
(n.s)
.842
(n.s)
.056
(n.s)
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Table 4.15

(continued)

Gender → IMI

.12

1.23

.219 (n.s)

.17

1.83

.067
(n.s)
Gender → RE
.08
.91
.360 (n.s) -.01
-.23
.831
(n.s)
Gender → BI
-.03
-.37
.707 (n.s) .03
.45
.651
(n.s)
Gender → DISC
-.04
-.48
.631 (n.s) .01
.11
.905
(n.s)
Gender → ModIMI .03
.47
.636 (n.s) .07
.86
.386
(n.s)
Gender → ModRE -.04
-.85
.376 (n.s) -.04
-.84
.400
(n.s)
Gender → SAT
-.02
-.46
.646 (n.s) .00
.16
.872
(n.s)
Gender → CONT
.07
1.73
.083 (n.s) .07
.76
.444
(n.s)
Note: n.s = non-significant, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; UNC = Perceived
Uncertainty, DOI = Discounting Own Information, IMI = Imitation, BI = Behavioral
Intention or Protection Motivation, TSUS = Threat Susceptibility, TSEV = Threat
Severity, RE = Response Efficacy, DISC = Disconfirmation, ModRE = Modified
Response Efficacy, ModIMI = Modified Imitation, SW = Switching Cost, SAT =
Satisfaction, CONT = Continuance Intention,

Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I presented the data analysis process and results. I started with
discussing the results of pilot study. Then, I described the results of the reliability
analysis, principal component analysis, and the manipulation check. Next, I presented the
data analysis for the main study including participants’ demographics, confirmatory
factor analysis including item descriptives, measurement invariance, construct reliability,
and validity. Then, I detail the results of the structural analysis including model fit, path
estimates and test of control variables in the model. The followings are the highlights of
data analysis results:
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•

Pilot data was highly reliability,

•

Manipulation check between control and treatment group showed
statistically significant difference,

•

Principal Component Analysis showed acceptable and significant item
loadings,

•

The final sample size for the main study was 214 (156 responses from
mTurk masters and 58 responses from Qualtrics),

•

Two measurement invariance tests (configural and metric invariance)
resulted in desirable findings, thus enabling the pooling of data (mTurk
masters and Qualtrics panel),

•

Measurement model has acceptable fit statistics,

•

Confirmatory Factor Analysis showed acceptable factor loading, construct
reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity,

•

Common Latent Factor method detected significant common method bias,

•

Dropping 5 items that caused the bias, resulted in non-significant method
bias,

•

Running Confirmatory Factor Analysis again with the remaining items to
make sure that dropping the 5 items has not compromised construct
reliability and validity. The second iteration showed that the model has
still reliability and validity.

•

The structural model fit statistics were acceptable.

•

24 out of 32 hypotheses were supported.
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•

The control variables (age, gender) did not have any statistically
significant influence on any of the dependent variables in the model,
except two items.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation is focused on the role of perceived uncertainty and herd behavior
in the adoption of security technologies. First, I conducted a thorough literature review on
relevant theoretical frameworks such as Protection Motivation Theory, Disconfirmation
Theory and Herd Behavior Theory, as well as the seminal and key articles in these areas
which informed my subsequent work. Next, based on the foundational theories and after
identifying a significant gap in the literature, I developed a conceptual research model
with supporting hypotheses to evaluate:
1. How can herd behavior influence protection motivation behavior in highly
uncertain circumstances?
2. To what extend can herd mentality influence users’ post-adoption behavior?
Then, I tested the conceptual research model using classical experimental design
through a field experiment. Prior to collecting data for the main investigation, I
conducted a preliminary investigation which included expert panel reviews and pilot
studies to ensure measurement reliability and validity. This preliminary investigation led
to minor improvement of the validity and reliability of the instrument. During the main
investigation, after ensuring construct reliability and validity, as well as acceptable model
fit, I tested the proposed model and hypotheses using two-group Structural Equation
Modeling. The analysis results indicated support for most of hypotheses in the
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experimental groups. In this chapter. I discuss some of the key findings of this study.
Then, I explain the theoretical and practical contributions. Finally, I discuss the
limitations of the study and future research directions.
Key Findings
The Manipulation Check
Behavioral research in IS and Information Security often relies on modeling and
hypothesizing abstract and high-level latent constructs such as perceived threat severity,
perceived response efficacy, and so forth. Analyzing the relationships between these
constructs in experimental studies usually requires a research design that enables
researchers to control and manipulate an effect.
For this purpose, manipulation checks should be used to determine whether
subjects’ perceptions of the independent variable in each group were manipulated in the
intended manner and that the experimental treatment was indeed effective. In other
words, these checks indicate whether the experimental manipulation was indeed effective
in providing strong evidence for inferring causality, thus proving that the levels of a
treatment were sufficiently different (Bagozzi, 1977). In this regard, Marett’s (2015)
analysis of a number of Information Security articles in top IS journals showed that only
32% reported the use of manipulation checks. In order to ensure that the treatment was
effective in this study, I used a manipulation check item that was presented to subjects in
both control and treatment group right after they read the narrative. Fortunately, the
independent t-test analysis showed that there is a significant difference between the two
groups in terms of their perceptions about the widespread use of Dashlane password
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managers. As a result, the hypothesis testing results can be interpreted with more
confidence about the causality of the treatment.
The Effect of Discounting Own Imitation on Imitation Tendency
One of the key hypotheses in this research is that discounting own information
could lead to tendency to imitate what other people are doing (H2). In fact, discounting
one’s own information indicates that users rely less on their initial information and
beliefs and tend to rely heavily on the insights from observations of others’ behavior.
Logically, the more users discount their own limited information, the more likely they
will tend to imitate what other users are doing. On the other hand, if users do not discount
own beliefs, the protection motivation should be essentially determined by their personal
perceptions of response efficacy.
Consistent with the theory, the effect of discounting own information on imitation
was non-significant for the control group (t = .90, p = .36), indicating that when users are
not aware of the popularity and widespread use of a security technology, they are less
likely to develop herd mentality and would probably rely solely on their own limited
information. Conversely, “discounting own information” significantly and positively
influenced “imitation” for the treatment (t = 2.22, p = .02). When discounting own
information happens, users become less responsive their own information and favor other
people’s technology adoption decision, believing that others are better informed;
therefore, they are more likely to imitate other even if their own information suggest
otherwise.
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Different Levels of Protection Motivation
One of the interesting findings of this study is that subjects in the treatment group
developed a higher level of protection motivation. In terms of explained variance (R 2),
the treatment group model explained more variance in the ultimate dependent variable at
the pre-adoption stage, protection motivation, than in control group (54% and 40%,
accordingly). This 14% difference in protection motivation can be a result of stronger
imitation to protection motivation relationship (in terms of standardized path coefficients)
in the treatment group, compared to the control group (.63 and .51, accordingly). The fact
that response efficacy (as the other direct antecedent) influence on protection motivation
in the treatment and group control are almost equally strong (.37 and .38, accordingly), it
is clear that imitation significantly affected protection motivation of the treatment group
subjects, as evidenced by higher explain variance in the ultimate dependent variable of
Time 1 (protection motivation or behavioral intention).
Cross-Temporal Hypotheses
As mentioned in Chapter II, sequential updating mechanism suggests that users’
perceptions about response efficacy (the effectiveness of a recommended security
solution) and other perceptions should be measured at the post-adoption stage as well the
adoption stage in order to capture the dynamic nature of continuous secure behavior
phenomenon. This conceptualization allows for understanding the distal effects of the
underlying mechanisms of continuous secure behavior. Consistent with this logic, I
proposed the following hypotheses:
H8: Response efficacy beliefs at the adoption stage are positively associated with
modified response efficacy beliefs at the post-adoption stage.
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H13: Intention to adopt a recommended security action at the adoption stage is
positively associated with post-adoption continuance intention.
H15: Imitation at the adoption stage are positively associated with modified
imitation at the post-adoption stage.
Table 5.1 depicts the hypothesis testing results for the two experimental groups:
Table 5.1

Hypothesis Testing for Cross-Temporal Relationships

Hypothesis
H8: Response efficacy beliefs at the
adoption stage are positively associated with
modified response efficacy beliefs at the postadoption stage.
H13: Intention to adopt a recommended
security action at the adoption stage is positively
associated with post-adoption continuance
intention.
H15: Imitation at the adoption stage are
positively associated with modified imitation at
the post-adoption stage.

Control Group

Treatment
Group

Supported

NOT Supported

NOT Supported

NOT Supported

Supported

Supported

While H8 and H15 were supported for both control and treatment group models,
H13 was not supported for any group. Theory of belief updating suggests that current
behavioral intention will serve as anchors for future evaluations, which will be updated
with new adjustments. In other words, users’ protection motivation at the initial
technology adoption stage will influence their protection motivation over time. Similar to
the findings of Kim & Malhotra (2005), the relationship between behavioral intention at
the pre-adoption and post-adoption stages were not supported in this study. A major
reason for explaining this result could be the role of experience with the security
technology. It is reasonable to argue that prior experience with security technologies is a
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crucial factor in determining continuous secure behavior because users who have directly
experienced using these technologies are likely to have a significant level of expectation
disconfirmation (positive or negative); thus, anticipating a direct relationship between
protection motivation (at the pre-adoption stage) and continuous secure behavior (at the
post-adoption stage) could be unwarranted.
The Effect of Switching Costs
In Chapter II, I argued that users with higher perceptions of switching costs
usually find other options less attractive, and eventually become less interested in other
alternatives. In other words, as the perceptions of switching costs increase, users’
inattentiveness to alternatives will increase (Kim & Son, 2009). Marketing literature also
suggests that switching costs usually reduce the number of alternatives that will be
considered by customers, significant decrease efforts to look for alternatives, and
diminish the propensity to search for alternatives (e.g. Weiss & Heide, 1993; Heide &
Weiss, 1995; Zauberman, 2003). The influence of switching costs on Continuous Secure
Behavior was not found significant in neither the control nor the treatment group (H14).
A possible explanation for this finding could be the timing of measuring switching costs.
For users, these costs may increase over time as they become less interested in other
alternatives due to a variety of reasons such as learning cost, search cost, transfer cost,
etc. In this research, the subjects had only 1 week use to Dashlane and therefore,
anticipating high perceived switching costs over this short amount of time could not be
expected.
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The Fading Effect of Herd Mentality
As mentioned in Chapter II, the findings of Sun’s (2013) longitudinal study show
that imitation could decrease post-adoption regret and therefore, become a legitimate
strategy for choosing a “good enough” technology (which may not necessarily be the
ideal option available). Users are inclined to adjust their personal beliefs when showing
herd behavior and to revive their discounted initial beliefs to modify their beliefs about
the technology at the post-adoption stage.
Decision makers are inclined to imitate each other, and at the same time, they tend
to do so in the correct direction (Sun, 2013). The probability of being in the correct
direction rises as more decisions are made rather than getting fixated to a steady state. In
a relevant study that is focused on understanding herd behavior in early adoption of novel
technologies and the dynamics of this phenomenon, Walden & Browne (2009) developed
and tested a model of observational learning to explain technology adoption decisions by
simulating users’ technology adoption based on private information and signals inferred
from observation of the actions of predecessors.
Walden & Browne’s (2009) simulations indicate two reasons to support the claim
that the probability of being in the correct direction rises as more decisions are made
rather than getting fixated to a steady state. First, in their study, they allow for extreme
observations in the signals. Additionally, instead of limiting the decision makers to
simple binary signals, they allow for signals to come from a normal distribution, and
thus, they can prefer one option a lot or a little or any amount. Moreover, when decision
makers reverse the prevailing herd direction, they could reset the prior beliefs of the next
decision maker (which could collapse incorrect herds). Thus, the possibility of extreme
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signals will have a greater tendency to reverse incorrect herds over time than to reverse
correct herds.
Drawing on these findings, I argued that in information security context, the
tendency to imitate other users in highly uncertain circumstances can influence users’
protection motivation (i.e. adoption of security technologies) and it is reasonable to argue
that at the post-adoptive stage, users may keep imitating others at the post-adoption stage.
In other words, users may continue using the same security technology because it is used
by a large number of people. Thus, I hypothesized that:
H16: Modified Imitation will be positively related to a user’s continuance
intention.
This hypothesis was not supported for the treatment group. In fact, the herd
mentality for the subjects in this group faded away at the post-adoptive stage and
interestingly, modified response efficacy (as the construct that captures the personal
assessment of the security technology) significantly influenced Continuous Secure
Behavior with a very high explained variance (R2 = .81). It indicates that at the postadoptive stage when users have less uncertainty about the security technology as a result
of actual experience, they heavily rely on their own assessment and unlike the
preadoption stage (when protection motivation can be significantly influenced by herd
mentality), post-adoption stage behavior is predominantly influenced by users’ personal
assessment of response efficacy and knowing about the popularity and widespread use of
the response is not as important as in the preadoption stage.
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Contributions to Research
Protection Motivation and Uncertainty
This research is the first study in the behavioral security literature that analyzes
the effect of herd behavior on protection motivation. IT users often make security-related
decisions in complex and multidimensional environments. The reliance on current
behavioral security theories, such as PMT, which do not account for such circumstances
can seriously limit researchers’ ability to understand such decision making. In this regard,
according to herd behavior theory, when individuals make decisions in highly uncertain
circumstances, they may observe the behavior of others, discount their own limited
information, and imitate others. The results of this study contribute to the existing
research by providing insights into protection motivation behavior from a different
theoretical perspective under the condition of high uncertainty. The findings showed that
in highly uncertain circumstances, when users become aware of popularity of a certain
security technology, they might discount their own information and imitate other users in
using that technology. In the theoretical model, herd-related relationships (perceived
uncertainty  discounting own information, discounting own information  imitation,
and imitation  protection motivation) are much stronger when users receive
information about the behavior of others.
In a post-hoc analysis, I compared the explained variance of protection motivation
(the dependent variable in Time 1) across groups. In order to conduct this analysis, I
started by comparing the two models: “PMT Constructs Only” and the ‘Full Model”,
which included PMT constructs plus herd behavior constructs. Table 5.2 summarizes the
results of this comparison.
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Table 5.2

Model Comparison

Model
PMT only
PMT + Herd

Control Group
.35
.38

Treatment Group
.39
.52

The findings showed that in the treatment group (i.e., the participants who read the
information about the widespread use of Dashlane), the amount of variance explained
increased by 13%. However, the change in the control group was considerably less at 3%,
indicating that the treatment made a significant difference in the participants’ intention to
use the recommended security solution of using the password manager.
Examining Herd Mentality at the Post-Adoptive Stage
As mentioned earlier, in information security context, the tendency to imitate
other users in uncertain circumstances can influence users’ adoption of security
technologies. We can have the same argument for the post-adoptive stage as IT herds are
usually robust and, therefore, users may keep imitating others at the post-adoption stage.
The findings of this study show that herd mentality (measured as modified imitation) for
the subjects in this group disappeared at the post-adoptive stage, and the personal
assessment of the security technology significantly influenced Continuous Secure
Behavior. It signifies that at the post-adoptive stage when users have actual experience
with the technology, they heavily rely on their own assessment. Thus, being aware of the
popularity and widespread use of the security response is not as important as in the
preadoption stage.
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Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Two Constructs
As mentioned earlier, the theory of sequential updating mechanism suggests that
users’ perceptions on response efficacy (the effectiveness of a recommended security
solution) and other perceptions (e.g. imitation tendency) should be measured at the postadoption stage as well the adoption stage in order to capture the dynamic nature of the
continuous behavior phenomenon, thus allowing for understanding the distal effects of
the underlying cognitive process that influences continuous behavior (Kim & Malhotra,
2005; Vedadi & Warkentin, 2018). Regarding the multi-stage design of the study
(including pre-adoption and post-adoption of a security software), I decided to develop
and validate two constructs such as modified response efficacy and modified imitation in
order to measure these perceptions at the post-adoption stage. This is especially important
because users generally go through a belief updating process after gaining direct
experience with a technology.
To develop these constructs, I did not have to go through the meticulous entire
scale development process (e.g. Churchill, 1979 or MacKenzie et al. 2011) because
response efficacy and imitation have been previously validated and I only needed to
slightly alter the definition and measurement items of these constructs for post-adoption
stage and then test their psychometric properties. After conducting several expert panel
reviews, I defined these constructs and their corresponding measurement items as
follows:
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Table 5.3

Validated Measurement Sales

Construct

Definition

Modified response efficacy

A user’s belief that the
recommended security
action is effective in
reducing or eliminating the
threat at the post-adoption
stage.

Measurement Items
1.Using Dashlane improves
my performance in
managing my passwords.
2.Using Dashlane increases
my productivity in
managing my passwords.
3.Using Dashlane enhances
my effectiveness in
managing my passwords.
1. It seems that Dashlane is
a widely-used password
manager, therefore I would
like to continue using it.

Modified imitation

A user chooses to keep
using the same security
technology because it is
popular.

2. I follow others to
continue to use Dashlane.
3. I would choose to
continue to use Dashlane
because many others are
already using it.

Table 5.4 depicts the reliability analysis results of the two constructs. Fortunately,
high reliability at construct and item level was established:
Table 5.4

New Constructs’ Reliability Analysis

Construct
Modified response efficacy

Cronbach’ Alpha
.938

Modified imitation

.935
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Item Square Multiple Correlation
ModRE1
.798
ModRE2
.730
ModRE3
.763
ModIMI1
.704
ModIMI2
.785
ModIMI3
.782

Table 5.5 and 5.6 depict the convergent and discriminant validity of these two
new constructs versus their corresponding modified constructs. Despite the almost
identical wordings of the items, construct validity was established:
Table 5.5

Response Efficacy vs. Modified Response Efficacy

Item
Factor 1
Factor 2
RE1
.885
RE2
.913
RE3
.859
ModRE1
.944
ModRE2
.922
ModRE3
.930
Values less than .4 are suppressed. Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation method: Varimax.
Table 5.6

Imitation vs. Modified Imitation

Item
Factor 1
Factor 2
IMI1
.905
IMI2
.900
IMI3
.912
ModIMI1
.905
ModIMI2
.910
ModIMI3
.911
Values less than .4 are suppressed. Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation method: Varimax.
Future research in the area of behavioral security and/or herd behavior in IS
context can use these validated measurement scales to measure the longitudinal nature of
secure behavior and decision making under highly uncertain circumstances.
Contributions to Practice
The results of this study indicate that individuals are influenced by the acts of
others. Hence, both managers and software security vendors should consider framing
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their communications (e.g., security training) to inform users that many others are
following recommended security procedures. Consistent with the success of the so-called
“nudges” used in behavioral economics applications, an employer may be able to
increase the overall security of the organization by providing information about the
behavior of others. For example, Barlow et al. (2013) found that a message providing
information about the compliance of others increased the likelihood that users would
comply with security policies.
The findings of this research indicate that herd mentality exerts a strong effect on
users’ decision making. A technology herd is unique in that early adopters determine the
option which followers tend to converge upon. This can explain why users quickly
converge on a specific technology and vastly ignore other options. Therefore, fostering
herd effects can significantly enhance and speed up technology adoption. It is crucial to
note that herding users to or against a certain option should be approached with great care
because in many cases, users may find that the advertised organizational adopters (the
herd leaders) are not necessarily similar to them in terms of sophistication level,
organizational tasks, etc. Hence, to promote herd mentality in the company toward using
security technologies and complying to IT security policies, managers should emphasize
the similarities between the prior adopters and potential adopters.
Managers should also recognize that herds may not last for a long time because a
high number of users’ interest in using a security technology (in a voluntary context) may
sharply decrease after a while, which in turn may lead to collapsing the current user base.
Users may ultimately evaluate their own needs and local use contexts (Sun, 2013).
Hence, promoting network externalities and publicizing the values of using a certain
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security technology to the potential users is vital for leading them to the right direction
(e.g. continuous use of a security technology).
At the organizational level, imitation-based behavior and decision making
frequently happens (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Companies imitate each other in
diffusing new technologies, data analytics methods, enterprise systems, etc. This
phenomenon can have different implications for companies. Firms imitate each other
sometimes to keep up with their competitors, or because they simply think that their
competitors’ choices of technology and systems are based on more quality information
and awareness (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). This approach to decision making can
intensify the errors of early movers who are characterized by choosing the right security
technology and sending the wrong signal to the late movers (or followers). Therefore,
imitation and herding can lead to significantly negative consequences for the company if
users converge on using the wrong security technologies and exhibiting perilous securityrelated behaviors. For instance, using Security-as-as-Service (SeCaaS) which is gradually
becoming a “popular” business model could be puzzling to IT security managers who on
one hand, have a negative attitude toward Cloud services in general, and other hand need
to either resist this popular trend or compromise to some extent. Hence, it is important for
IT managers and policy makers to predict the IT security phenomena that are highly
likely to become popular, carefully identify their harmful implications, and determine the
possible opportunities to leverage such phenomena.
Limitation and Future Research
Like any research, this research has several limitations that will be discussed in
this section. Generally, the goal of research is to maximize three criteria: generalizability,
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precision, and realism (McGrath, 1994). However, attempting to maximize one of these
three criteria results in sacrificing the other criteria (McGrath, 1994). Accordingly, this
research is also not exempt from limitations; however, understanding these limitations
can lead to future research opportunities. Limitations of this study pertain to the
theoretical constructs excluded from the model, the research method used to test the
proposed model, and the sampling frame. Through future research, limitations may be
overcome by examining the impact of additional constructs, conducting research using
additional methods, and collecting data from additional sources.
Validation of Using the Security Software
As mentioned in Chapter III, I asked the subjects in both control and treatment
group to use a free version of a password manager (Dashlane) for a week and take a
follow-up survey. For two primary reasons, it was not possible to be completely sure that
subjects used Dashlane. First, IRB regulations discourage monitoring of subjects’
behavior without their consent. Private information includes information about behavior
that occurs in a context in which an individual can reasonably expect that no observation
or recording is taking place. In addition, notifying subjects that their behavior will be
recorded can confound the findings (also known Hawthorne Effect). Second, I had no
affiliation with Dashlane Corporation and was not able to check the subjects’ system
logs. Therefore, I had to take several measures to increase the likelihood of truthful
response from subjects (making sure they have actually used Dashlane in the one-week
interval).
First, at the beginning of Time 2 survey, I provided the name of 9 password
managers to subjects and asked them to choose the one that I asked them to use during
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the one-week interval. Any subject who chose the wrong answer or choose Dashlane at
their second or third attempt was automatically disqualified to take the rest of the survey.
Figure 5.1 depicts the screenshot of this skip logic:

Figure 5.1

Usage Validation Screen

In the next screen, I asked subjects to “certify” whether they used Dashlane
during the week and those who chose NO were disqualified to take the rest of the survey.
Fortunately, there were few subjects who failed at these two validation checks; thus,
giving more confidence in the quality of data.
Individual Differences
One of the limitations of this study is that the individual differences was not
measured. These differences are believed to significantly influence users’ experience
with technologies and information systems. Specifically, the effect of cognitive,
personality, and situational variables in technology use context is of great importance
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(Zmud, 1979). These characteristics affect users’ perceptions of the capabilities of
technologies.
In herd behavior context, some users may sometimes intentionally avoid joining a
technology herd. Similarly, some organizations persist on looking different than their
competitors and avoid using a technology just because it is “too popular” in the industry
(Abrahamson & Rosenkoft, 1993). Users may feel that adopting “fashionable”
technology may make them look average (Sun, 2013). Future studies may investigate
why and who is more or less likely to join a technology herd. In other words, what
cognitive styles and personality traits make users more or less likely to follow a herd.
One of the most important personality traits in predicting users’ susceptibility to
herd mentality is the level of certainty/uncertainty orientation (as mentioned in Chapter
II). Rokeach (1960) distinguished between people who do not usually appear to be very
fearful of uncertainty and are generally able to resolve it and people who find new
evidence or inconsistent information threatening. Sorrentino & Short (1986) argue that
uncertainty-oriented individuals become highly motivated in situations where there is a
certain degree of uncertainty about the self and the environment for them to resolve.
Certainty-oriented persons are, in fact more motivated when there is no substantial
uncertainty about the self or the environment.
Similarly, Sorrentino & Hewitt (1984) found that uncertainty-oriented individuals
choose to engage in an activity that could reduce uncertainty about the self, regardless of
the potential result. Certainty-oriented people, on the other hand, choose to engage in an
activity that could not necessarily resolve uncertainty. It can be assumed that certainty-
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oriented individuals do not tend to know much new information about the self, regardless
of the value of such information.
Certainty-oriented people’s tendency to retain certainty or clarity related to their
current cognitions rather than trying to resolve uncertainty, has been studied in
information processing and persuasion. For example, Sorrentino et al. (1988) found that
uncertainty-oriented individuals increase their processing of arguments, and decrease
their use of heuristic cues, just as personal relevance increased.
In contrast, certainty-oriented individuals, however are more likely to use
heuristics, and to engage in less systematic processing, especially when personal
relevance increased. Additionally, such individuals are more likely to engage in
systematic processing and less likely to engage in heuristic processing than were
uncertainty-oriented people when personal relevance is low.
Sorrentino et al. (1992) demonstrate that whether the situation is associated with
uncertainty about the self or about the outcome, uncertainty-oriented people are
motivated to resolve the uncertainty but certainty-oriented people are motivated to avoid
the situation. Other studies suggest that uncertainty-oriented people prefer to deal directly
with uncertainty, whereas certainty-oriented individuals are more likely to be oriented to
the familiar and certain circumstances. These different tendencies intensify as the task
becomes more personally relevant to the individual (Driscoll et al. 1991). Future studies
can measure the influence of this personality trait (and other important ones) in order to
further deepen our understanding of the antecedents and triggers of herd behavior.
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Cultural Differences
Another limitation of this study is that the subjects were US-based, thus reducing
the generalizability of the findings to other users from different cultures. Ethnic groups
may have significantly different cultural values that may or may not be espoused on the
individual (Srite & Karahanna, 2006). Espoused cultural values may affect IT security
behaviors; therefore, conducting cross-cultural research may reveal the importance of
additional factors that can influence users’ herd mentality in the behavioral security
contexts. In other words, differences in national culture can shed insight into the factors
shaping herd behavior and comparative cross-country cultural analysis is crucial for the
examination of this phenomenon. For example, Confucian culture emphasizes obedience,
ethics, and collectivism, indicating that a Confucian culture may have high power
distance, low individualism, high masculinity, and low uncertainty avoidance.
Conversely, western culture is based on science, reality, and individualism.
In the finance literature, it is proven the cultural difference can have significant influence
on herd behavior. For instance, Chang & Lin (2015) studied the effects of national culture
on investors' decision-making processes in international stock markets. Findings provided
evidence that herd behavior occur more often in Confucian and less sophisticated equity
markets. Additionally, their findings showed that some national culture indices are
closely correlated with the exhibition of herding.
Similarly, Zhan (2012) examined the effects of national culture on herd behavior
across international financial markets, the relation between national culture and investor
behavior and overall market volatility. The findings showed that nations with lower value
of individualistic culture are more likely to have a higher number of synchronized stock
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price movements. In addition, correlations between stock price movements increase stock
market volatility, that nations with high individualistic culture tend to have a lower
number of synchronized stock price movements and smaller stock market volatility, and
that the positive relationship between synchronized stock price movements.
The Complex Nature of Perceived Uncertainty
As discussed in Chapter II, perceived uncertainty (defined as a user’s perceived
inability to predict the effectiveness of a technology due to having imperfect information)
is a major antecedent of herd behavior. In order to measure this construct in the research
model, I used a reflective measurement scale, which is characterized by using items that
measure the very same concept. However, perceived uncertainty as a key trigger of herd
behavior, is not a unidimensional concept.
Milliken (1987) conceptualized three main types of uncertainties including state
uncertainty, effect uncertainty, and response uncertainty. “State Uncertainty” is the
perception that the environment or a particular component of that environment is not
predictable. “Effect Uncertainty” refers to the inability to predict the nature of the impact
of a future state of the environment on the organization. “Response Uncertainty” is the
lack of knowledge of options and an inability to predict the possible outcome of a
response choice.
Each of the three types of uncertainty is applicable to IS security context as
follows (Sun, 2013):
•

A user may be unclear about what a security technology is for (state
uncertainty).
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•

A user may be uncertain about what a security technology can do for him/her
(effect uncertainty)

•

A user may not be able to deal with potential changes of a security
technology, such as upgrades, requirements or support after the initial
adoption (response uncertainty).

Future research should conceptualize and operationalize perceived uncertainty as a
multidimensional construct which includes all three types of uncertainty. The
measurement scale used in the study (adapted from Sun, 2013) has 1 item per each
uncertainty type but the different types of perceived uncertainty are broad enough to be
separate (yet interrelated) constructs. Then, it would be interesting to investigate how and
why each dimension of perceived uncertainty influences herd behavior in the IS security
context. A good starting point is drawing on the Ashill & Jobber’s (2009) scale
development study. Using a two-phase empirical study, they developed and tested three
measurement scales for state, effect, and response uncertainty. Their study also suggests
that managers do make a meaningful distinction between these different types of
uncertainty, indicating that it is worthwhile measuring all three constructs as they have
divergent impacts on decision making, and that there are linkages between them.
The Role of Trust
When it comes to using password managers, one of the most important concerns
of the potential users is the issue of trust. We have been told many times that we should
not put all our eggs in one basket. To some people, using a password manager is like
inviting hackers to attack and steal their passwords. To some other people, it is
sometimes better to put all your eggs in one basket if it is more secure than the ones you
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can build yourself. For the former group of people, incidents like the security breach of
OneLogin password manager could further reduce their level of trust in such security
software; thus, reducing their imitation tendencies in uncertain circumstances. Therefore,
investigating the influence of different types and levels of trust and how it can affect
users’ herd mentality is both interesting and important. Baddeley (2011) emphasizes the
important role of trust in herd behavior and argues that for security and human behavior,
decisions are made in a multidimensional space, reflecting contradictory goals and
therefore, trust has a vital influence in this area because effective security software will
allow transparent communication between trusted parties but will be closed to the "bad
guys" (p.13).
Future research can explore the role of trust on herd behavior by theorizing the
effect of different types of trust and how each type can influence herd behavior in what
way. A good starting point is building on McKnight et al. (1998; 2002) studies that
conceptualized the typology of trust as follows:
•

Institution-based trust is the belief that needed structural conditions are
present (e.g., in the Internet) to enhance the probability of achieving a
successful outcome in an endeavor like e-commerce.

•

Disposition to trust is the extent to which a person displays a tendency to be
willing to depend on others across a broad spectrum of situations and persons.

•

Trusting beliefs means the confident truster perception that the trustee—for
example, a specific Web-based vendor—has attributes that are beneficial to the
truster.
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Future research should theorize the role of trust in influencing users’ tendency to
adopt a security technology in high uncertain circumstances and how it can affect users’
herd mentality. For example, if an uncertain user observes a security seal sign (like
VeriSign signature) on a popular website or mobile app, is he or she more likely to
discount own information and imitate others in joining the herd? Future research can also
examine whether a high trust in followers of a herd can outweigh the trust in the IT
security software itself.
Which Herd to Follow?
Not all the herds look the same to people. Herds are generally characterized by
their size and identity. Users might be more willing to join a herd whose followers are
similar to them. This concept is called perceived homophily. Homophily, also
known as similarity, refers to the degree to which people are similar regarding certain
attributes (Rogers, 1983). These characteristics include demographic characteristics,
interests, preferences, and personality traits. The central notion of homophily is that
individuals tend to interact with similar others (McPherson et al., 2001), meaning that
information flow is likely to be activated among homophilous people. In other words,
individuals tend to perceive a strong influence from homophilous others (Brown &
Reingen, 1987).
Perceived homophily can be measured as a multidimensional construct including
two dimensions of homophily, namely, background homophily and attitude homophily.
Background homophily highlights social background similarities, and attitude homophily
emphasizes similar values, preferences, and attitudes between individuals (McCroskey et
al. 2006; Shen et al. 2016). Social Proof Theory supports this idea by explaining that
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individuals determine whether to adopt a behavior by examining the behavior of others,
especially the similar ones because payoff of a behavior is a function of social approval
(Liu, 2015).
Measuring the influence of different types of perceived homophily on herd
behavior was outside the scope of this study but it would be crucial for future research to
shed light on this phenomenon by scrutinizing the different characteristics of technology
herds in the IS security context.
Measuring Other PMT Constructs
In order to have a parsimonious research model and to manage the scope of this
research project, I only measured three primary PMT constructs from both threat
appraisal and coping appraisal stages including threat susceptibility, threat severity, and
response efficacy. Future research can study the effect of other PMT constructs on herd
behavior such as response cost, maladaptive reward, and self-efficacy. Response cost,
which is any cost (e.g., monetary, personal, time, effort) associated with taking the
adaptive coping response, could substantially affect users’ tendency to join or avoid a
herd. Response efficacy and self-efficacy may elevate the probability of adopting a
security technology, whereas perception of high response costs can decrease this
probability (Floyd et al. 2000). Maladaptive rewards (or responses) are undesired
behaviors intended only to decrease fear but not the danger posed by the threat. These
responses are also known as fear control (Boss et al. 2015), as opposed to danger control,
the adaptive response. Future longitudinal studies can investigate whether subjects recall
their fear or perceptions of maladaptive responses after the completion of the study in
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order to analyze the effect of these rewards in highly uncertain circumstances. Based on
the context, a maladaptive response could be either joining or avoiding a herd.
Conclusion
IT users often make security-related decisions in complex and multidimensional
environments. Over-reliance on current behavioral security theories (e.g. Protection
Motivation Theory) that do not account for circumstances under which these decisions
occur can seriously limit researchers’ ability to comprehend this phenomenon. Herd
behavior theory explains that when individuals make decisions in highly uncertain
circumstances, they observe what other people are doing, discount their own limited
information, and imitate others. Explaining protection motivation behavior from a
different theoretical perspective is one of the primary contributions of this study. The
findings of this research show that in uncertain circumstances and when there is
awareness about the widespread use of a certain security technology, users develop a
significantly higher protection motivation.
Investigating whether protection motivation behaviors influenced by herd
mentality can impact continuous secure behavior, as a very important and understudied
information security phenomenon, is the other contribution of this study; therefore, I
examined whether herd mentality persists over time. The results show that at the postadoption stage, users tend to heavily rely on their own information and disregard the
herd-related factors.
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APPENDIX A
CONSTRUCT RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY AFTER DROPPING ITEMS
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.96

.82

.90

.88

.84

.84

.93

.94

.94

.86

.93

.97

.93

TSUS

TSEV

RE

UNC

DOI

IMI

DISC

ST

SW

ModRE

CONT

ModIMI

CR

.83

.92

.83

.68

.85

.82

.81

.73

.64

.71

.82

.61

.89

AVE

.45

.75

.80

.13

.80

.80

.47

.35

.35

.37

.22

.22

.47

MSV
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.26

.27

.03

.25

.26

.16

.05

.06

.14

.04

.07

.17
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.48

.41

.46

.10

.34

.40

.68

.04

-.37

.61

.18

.38
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.25

.18

.16

.21

.08

.14

.37

.12

-.03

.45

.47

.78
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.08

.10

.10

.04

.02

.05

.13

-.13

.00

.40
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.31

.33

.06

.22

.27

.56
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-.42

.84

RE

.02

-.07

-.15
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-.08

-.04

-.24

.59

.80
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Construct Reliability and Validity (After Dropping Items)

BI

Table A.1

.32

.11

.08

.20

.07

.13

.19

.86

DOI

.53

.41

.39

.22

.35

.35
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IMI

.64

.82

.89

.16

.89

.90

DISC

.64

.86

.88

.13

.92

ST

.36

.24

.15

.82

SW

.62

.85

.91
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.67

.96

CONT

.91

ModIMI

Table A.2

Factor Loadings after Dropping Items
Item
TSUS1
TSUS2
TSUS3
TSEV1
TSEV3
RE1
RE2
RE3
UNC1
UNC3
UNC4
DOI1
DOI2
IMI1
IMI2
IMI3
DISC1
DISC2
DISC3
DISC4
SAT1
SAT2
SAT3
SW1
SW2
SW3
ModRE1
ModRE2
ModRE3
CONT1
CONT2
CONT3
ModIMI1
ModIMI2
ModIMI3
B1
B2
B4

Loading
.72
.75
.86
.89
.92
.87
.89
.76
.80
.85
.74
.90
.81
.90
.91
.89
.94
.90
.87
.89
.94
.93
.90
.76
.85
.86
.94
.88
.91
.95
.95
.98
.87
.93
.92
.94
.94
.95
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